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Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CASE STUDY 1 HOUR

MAX 250 WORDS PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER use theories     THANK YOU

Case study:

Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other. The third person, who receives nothing, has an incentive to strike a bargain with the second, offering a split of, say, $50 each, which makes them both better off than under the initial proposal. Faced with desertion, the first person can destabilize the new coalition by offering to accept $45, leaving $55 for one of the others. And so on. The game has three possible (and equally likely) outcomes in which two of the three players accept payments of $50 each, but the third player can always upset the equilibrium by cutting another deal. The same endless series of changing winning coalitions or vote “cycles” can emerge in elections involving three or more candidates or ballot issues when no one of them is strongly preferred by a simple majority of the voters.

Question: It has been recognized at least since the time of the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) that voting among three or more candidates or alternatives may fail to select the majority’s most preferred outcome or may be prone to vote “cycles” producing no clear winner.  Which behavioral science theory is relevant to this case and how might solutions be implemented in this case? 


Assignment status: Solved by our Writing Team at CapitalEssayWriting.comCLICK HERE TO ORDER THIS PAPER AT CapitalEssayWriting.com

Categories
Writers Solution

Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other.

 PUBLIC AFFAIRS CASE STUDY 1 HOUR

MAX 250 WORDS PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER use theories     THANK YOU

Case study:

Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other. The third person, who receives nothing, has an incentive to strike a bargain with the second, offering a split of, say, $50 each, which makes them both better off than under the initial proposal. Faced with desertion, the first person can destabilize the new coalition by offering to accept $45, leaving $55 for one of the others. And so on. The game has three possible (and equally likely) outcomes in which two of the three players accept payments of $50 each, but the third player can always upset the equilibrium by cutting another deal. The same endless series of changing winning coalitions or vote “cycles” can emerge in elections involving three or more candidates or ballot issues when no one of them is strongly preferred by a simple majority of the voters.

Question: It has been recognized at least since the time of the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) that voting among three or more candidates or alternatives may fail to select the majority’s most preferred outcome or may be prone to vote “cycles” producing no clear winner.  Which behavioral science theory is relevant to this case and how might solutions be implemented in this case? 

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Writers Solution

Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other.

 PUBLIC AFFAIRS CASE STUDY 1 HOUR

MAX 250 WORDS PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER use theories     

Case study:

Consider the problem of dividing $100 among three people. Suppose two of them agree to split that sum, with $60 going to one and $40 to the other. The third person, who receives nothing, has an incentive to strike a bargain with the second, offering a split of, say, $50 each, which makes them both better off than under the initial proposal. Faced with desertion, the first person can destabilize the new coalition by offering to accept $45, leaving $55 for one of the others. And so on. The game has three possible (and equally likely) outcomes in which two of the three players accept payments of $50 each, but the third player can always upset the equilibrium by cutting another deal. The same endless series of changing winning coalitions or vote “cycles” can emerge in elections involving three or more candidates or ballot issues when no one of them is strongly preferred by a simple majority of the voters.

Question: It has been recognized at least since the time of the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) that voting among three or more candidates or alternatives may fail to select the majority’s most preferred outcome or may be prone to vote “cycles” producing no clear winner.  Which behavioral science theory is relevant to this case and how might solutions be implemented in this case? 

Assignment status: Solved by our Writing Team at PrimeWritersBay.comCLICK HERE TO ORDER THIS PAPER AT PrimeWritersBay.com

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Suppose that you run a tutoring service for economics students.

Question 2-Suppose that you run a tutoring service for economics students. The table below reports the demand for your services by 8 studentsper week. In the table are reported each student’s reservation price of a tutoring session per week. Note that each student demands atmost one tutorial session per week.~In addition, the opportunity cost of your time is $24 per session. There are no competitors for your service.StudentReservation PricedNumber ofTotal RevenueMarginal Revenue($ per session )<Sessions given($ per week)($ per Week)40LDe34640LLGO280LLLA) How many tutor session is socially optimal? Explain.~B) Assume that you can only charge a single price for your services. What price are you going to charge the students tomaximize your profit? How many sessions will you sell?~C) Now, suppose that you are able to practice perfect price discrimination. How many sessions will you sell to maximise profits?Compute consumer surplus and the Deadweight loss. ~