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Incarceration by the Numbers section in the Deviance and Crime

Required Reading/Watching

Prior to this discussion, you should have:

  • Read chapter on Deviance and Crime
  • Review lecture notes for Deviance and Crime
  • Reviewed the Incarceration by the Numbers section in the Deviance and Crime module

This is a brief discussion, so you are not expected to write as much as you have in your first discussion. Instead, in about a paragraph write about two things.

  1. What are two takeaways that you had after engaging with the website and data?
  2. Explain why these two takeaways matter in terms of our view of incarceration in the United States. For example, you might explain why these takeaways matter.

Writing a “meaningful” discussion

Remember that meaningful discussions typically have a few components. First, they should cite a variety of the materials available for review or covered in class. This demonstrates your level of engagement with the course content. Second, meaningful discussions go beyond repeating what others have said. Your discussion can include quotes from the sources but they should be primarily made of your own words so you can demonstrate the development of your own sociological perspective and voice. Third, expressing opinions are absolutely fine but they ought to be grounded in some sociological perspective or theory, not just how you feel.  

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What types of crimes do organized crime groups commit?

Abadinsky

Discussion Board Topic: What types of crimes do organized crime groups commit? Why do you feel that these types of criminal actions are chosen? How do some of these crimes harm legitimate businesses? Use evidence from your readings and module videos to support your thoughts.

Discussion Board Guidelines: Submit an answer to the discussion board. Each discussion board post will be between 250 – 350 words long. Refer & cite current resources in your answer.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Organized Crime in Labor, Business, and Money Laundering

Abadinsky, Organized Crime 10th ed.

In 1957, Albert Anastasia, boss of the Gambino Family and unofficial ruler of the Brooklyn waterfront, was murdered in a barber’s chair at a New York hotel. His brother, (“Tough”) Tony Anastasio, a member of the Gambino Family and official ruler of the Brooklyn waterfront, remained head of International Longshoremen’s Local 1814 in Red Hook, Brooklyn, until his natural death in 1963. This chapter discusses the four international unions connected to OC.

2

LABOR RACKETEERING

 Infiltration, domination, and use of a union for personal benefit by illegal, violent, and fraudulent means.

Labor rackets assume 3 basic forms:

 Sale of “strike insurance.”

 “Sweetheart deal.”

 Siphoning of union funds.

3

ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICA

 Civil War led to dramatic industrialization of U.S.

 Industrialization led to unionization.

 Labor wars.

 Wagner Act of 1935: Right of workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining.

4

LABOR RACKETEERING: IN THE BEGINNING…

 In the early days, labor unions provided “muscle” from the ranks of their membership to deal with management Pinkerton agents and strikebreakers.

Abuse of power, needless strikes, extortionate practices.

Benjamin “Dopey” Fein: Jewish gang leader, part of Jewish labor movement.

 Protected pickets and union delegates against management goons.

5

LEPKE BUCHALTER

Worked as strong-arm for labor-industrial racketeers.

Revolutionized labor racketeering.

 Infiltrated unions and management to gain control.

 Extorted wealth from NY garment, leather, baking, trucking industries.

6

LABOR RACKETEERING AND THE BIG FOUR

Unions also fought with each other.

 During struggles over jurisdiction and representation between the AFL and the CIO, both sides resorted to muscle from organized crime.

 Many locals and some internationals were delivered into the hands of organized crime.

1982 congressional committee: International unions (LIUNA, HEREIU, ILA, IBT) are dominated by OC.

7

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA (LIUNA)

Close ties to the Outfit.

Surveillance tapes of New Jersey Family boss Sam DeCavalcante, discussing how control of Laborers’ Union locals enabled him to “shake down” building contractors who wanted to avoid using expensive union labor.

2000: 127 LIUNA officials found to be OC members or associates.

8

HOTEL EMPLOYEES AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION (HEREIU)

HEREIU charters often provided the basis for extortion.

 “If an owner knew what was good for him, he agreed to have his place unionized upon the first visit of the organizer.”

 The Philadelphia local was controlled by the Family headed by Angelo Bruno.

Bruno Family members forced hotels in Atlantic City to buy supplies and provisions from companies they own.

9

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION (ILA)

The NY waterfront harbor plays a critical role in the movement of goods throughout the Eastern seaboard.

Without government regulation, OC controlled it.  In control of the ILA, OC targeted the shipping

industry.  Ship turnaround time is crucial to shippers.  Shakedown shippers by threatening walkouts.

The “shape up” provided corrupt ILA officials with kickbacks from workers eager for a day’s wage.

10

WATERFRONT COMMISSION

 In 1952, it was revealed that OC, using its control of the ILA, “had for years been levying the equivalent of a 5 percent tax on all general cargo moving in and out of the harbor.”

 Outrage led to the 1953 establishment of the New York–New Jersey Waterfront Commission.

 Commission has banned persons with serious criminal records from the docks.

 Eliminated the “shape-up.”

 Convicted criminals prohibited from holding office in waterfront unions.

 Commission audits books and records of licensed stevedore firms to guard against illegal payoffs and other violations.

11

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS (IBT)

 IBT is the most important union to come under the domination of organized crime because virtually every consumer product needs to be trucked.

Largest labor union in U.S.  1.4+ million truckers, delivery drivers, warehouse

workers, flight attendants, and other workers.  Lost membership since 1970s.  Once represented 80 percent of long-haul truck

drivers, but now represents only about 8 percent. 12

JIMMY HOFFA, TONY PROVENZANO (“TONY PRO”), JOHN DIOGUARDI AND ANTHONY CORALLO,

ALLEN DORFMAN, JACKIE PRESSER

Some of these went from union reformer to labor racketeer. Others began as racketeers.

They used corrupt methods to gain high position in the union, and used union funds for personal use.

Most were convicted of crimes. Some were acquitted when witnesses were murdered.

Several corrupt local unions were placed in trusteeships by the government.

13

HOFFA VERSUS KENNEDY

Hoffa was subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.

 He referred to committee counsel Robert Kennedy as “Bob” or “Bobby” and as “nothing but a rich man’s kid.”

 1960: John F. Kennedy was elected president of the United States and appointed his brother Robert attorney general. Robert Kennedy made the Labor Racketeering Unit of the Criminal Division his personal “Get Hoffa Squad.”

Hoffa was subsequently accused of trying to bribe jurors and in 1964 was convicted of jury tampering and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.

14

BUSINESS RACKETEERING

There is no hard-and-fast line separating labor racketeering from business racketeering—one is often an integral part of the other.

 In many schemes involving corrupt union officials, “legitimate” businessmen have willingly cooperated in order to derive benefits such as decreased labor costs, inflated prices, or increased business in the market.

15

THE GARMENT CENTER

 Business racketeering in NY’s garment industry dates back to Lepke Buchalter.

 Today it centers on racketeer control of local trucking: whoever controls trucking controls the industry.  The fast-paced nature of the fashion industry cannot

countenance delays in shipping garments. Until 1992, garment center trucking was controlled by

Carlo Gambino’s sons.  1992 plea deal: Gambino brothers pled guilty to restraint

of trade violations and agreed to quit NYC’s garment center and pay a fine of $12 million.

16

RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Bid rigging and customer allocation are restraint of trade violations of the Sherman Act.

 Maximum fine for corporations: $100 million.

 OC provides a restraint-of-trade policing service.

Sometimes, OC “muscles in” to extort a part, when otherwise legitimate businesses have illegal restraint of trade agreements among themselves.

17

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

OC can limitt competition by enforcing a system of collusive bidding.

Construction contractors, assisted or led by union officials and LCN family members, allocate jobs among themselves and exclude non-cartel.

Participant companies are beneficiaries, not victims, since the benefits of the cartel offset the increased costs it imposes.

18

PRIVATE SOLID WASTE CARTING

Companies “faced with the constant threat of cutthroat competition are tempted to pay gangsters for protection against competitors.”

Competition drives down profits until, with or without help from OC, an association is formed.

Members divide up the industry, allocating territories or specific customers.

Members (illegally) agree not to compete for another member’s business.

19

CRIMINALS IN A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS

6 reasons for OC involvement in legitimate business:

 Profit

 Diversification

 Transfer

 Services

 Front

 Taxes

20

THE SCAM / BUST OUT

Bankruptcy fraud that victimizes wholesale providers of various goods and sometimes insurance companies

The business used as the basis for a scam may be set up with that scheme as its purpose, or it may be an established business that has fallen into OC control as a result of gambling or loan shark debt.

21

STOCK FRAUD

Through the OC network, stolen securities can be transferred to a country with strict bank secrecy laws.

The securities are deposited in a bank, which issues a letter of credit, which is used to secure loans that are then defaulted.

 Used as collateral for bank loans from “cooperative” loan officials or “rented” to legitimate businessmen in need of collateral for instant credit.

22

MONEY LAUNDERING

Cash-rich criminals have a problem: laundering their illegal gains.

Modern financial systems permit instant transfer of millions of dollars through personal computers and satellite dishes.

Money is laundered through currency exchange houses, stock brokerage houses, gold dealers, casinos, automobile dealerships, insurance companies, and trading companies.

23

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The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States

Assignment: Read The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States.

Actions

Evaluate the development of the victims’ rights movement. Has it been effective? Why or why not? What are some ways this movement has helped victims seek justice?

Submission Requirements

  • One (1) page
  • Name, class, and date should be at the top of the page
  • 12 point font
  • Times New Roman or Arial
  • Use in-text citations
  • List all references at bottom of the page (APA)

Grading Criteria

  • Review the grading rubric below this assignment to see how it is assessed.

The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement

in the United States

A COMPONENT OF THE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Sponsored by:

Office for Victims of Crime Office of Justice Programs U.S. Department of Justice

Written by Dr. Marlene Young and John Stein National Organization for Victim Assistance

December 2004

Justice Solutions National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards

National Association of VOCA Assistance Administrators National Organization for Victim Assistance

This project was supported by Grant Number 2002-VF-GX-0009 awarded by the Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

PAGE

The OVC Oral History Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Office for Victims of Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Beginnings: Victimology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Victim Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Women’s Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Criminal Justice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Growth of Victim Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The 1980s: Growth and Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The 1990s and Beyond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Research Contributions and Advances in Responding to Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Expanding and Deepening Victim Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Ongoing March for Victims’ Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Contents

2 0 0 5 N C V R W R E S O U R C E G U I D E

The OVC Oral History Project The Office for Victims of Crime Oral History Project is cosponsored by Justice Solutions, the National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards, the National Association of VOCA Assistance Administrators, and the National Organization for Victim Assistance. Sponsored by the Office for Victims of Crime, within the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, this project seeks to document the rich history of the victims’ rights and assistance field since its inception in 1972. The project’s four goals are to:

1. Develop two special reports that highlight the historical importance of two events: 1) the 30-year anniversary of the field and 2) the 20-year anniversary of the publication of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime Final Report.

2. Provide initial documentation via videotape of the past 30 years of the victims’ rights and assistance movement through interviews with key contributors to the movement’s overall success.

3. Develop archives housed in a university setting (videotaped and paper-based), as well as on the Web (digital tape and electronic versions of transcripts).

4. Develop a recommended format for states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia to develop their own individual oral history.

The Office for Victims of Crime The Office for Victims of Crime is committed to enhancing the Nation’s capacity to assist crime victims and to providing leadership in changing attitudes, policies, and practices to promote justice and healing for all victims of crime. OVC works with national, international, state, military, and tribal victim assistance and criminal justice agencies, as well as other professional organizations, to promote fundamental rights and comprehensive services for crime victims.

Introduction The crime victims’ movement is an outgrowth of the rising social consciousness of the 1960s that unleashed the energies of the idealistic, 20-something generation of the 1970s. Its continued strength is derived not just from the social forces through which it began, but also from the leadership of extraordinary individuals, some of whom have personally survived tragedy, and others who have brought extraordinary compassion and insight as witnesses to such tragedy.

In retrospect, one can say that the victims’ movement in the United States involved the confluence of five independent activities:

1. The development of a field called victimology.

2. The introduction of state victim compensation programs.

3. The rise of the women’s movement.

4. The rise of crime that was accompanied by a parallel dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.

5. The growth of victim activism.

The Beginnings: Victimology “Victimology” arose in Europe after World War II, primarily to seek to understand the criminal-victim relationship. Early victimology theory posited that victim attitudes and conduct are among the causes of criminal behavior.(1)

The importation of victimology to the United States was due largely to the work of the scholar Stephen Schafer, whose book The Victim and His Criminal: A Study in Functional Responsibility became mandatory reading for anyone interested in the study of crime victims and their behaviors.(2)

As Tokiwa University (Japan) Professor of Criminology and Victimology John Dussich noted, “As a graduate student in 1962, I had the privilege of being a student of Stephen Schafer who was a victimologist and criminologist from Hungary, one of the early victimologists. He first spoke about victimology in his class on criminological theory. It was the first time that he ever gave a lecture in this country and we became friends after that.”

The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States

2 0 0 5 N C V R W R E S O U R C E G U I D E 1

The interest in victimology correlated with increasing concern about crime in America in the late 1960s. It is perhaps no coincidence that the precursor to Dr. Schafer’s book was a study he conducted for the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.(3) The crime wave of the time led to the formation of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1966, which conducted the first national victimization surveys that, in turn, showed that victimization rates were far higher than shown in law enforcement figures – and that many non-reporting victims acted out of distrust of the justice system.(4)

This captured the attention of researchers who began to examine the impact of crime on victims, as well as victim disillusionment with the system.

“In my view it is no accident that the explosion of interest in victims and victimization surveys developed simultaneously,” Michael J. Hindelang wrote in “Victimization Surveying, Theory and Research” published in 1982. “Each has provided some stimulus for the other and each has the potential for providing benefits to the other.”(5)

As will be discussed, the prosecutor-based victim/witness revolution in particular was a direct consequence of victimological research.

Victim Compensation The idea that the state should provide financial reimbursement to victims of crime for their losses was initially propounded by English penal reformer Margery Fry in the 1950s. It was first implemented in New Zealand in 1963 and Great Britain passed a similar law shortly thereafter.

Early compensation programs were welfare programs providing help to victims in need. This was reflected in Justice A.J. Goldberg’s comment, “In a fundamental sense, then, one who suffers the impact of criminal violence is also the victim of society’s long inattention to poverty and social injustice…”(6) California initiated the first state victim compensation program in 1965, soon followed by New York. By 1979, there were 28 state compensation programs. By then, most had rejected the welfare precept in favor of a justice orientation in which victims were seen as deserving of compensation whether or not they were in need. Compensation programs also promoted involvement by

victims in the criminal justice system since they required victims to report crimes to the police and to cooperate with the prosecution.

Administrators of the early programs were not always passionate advocates of victim issues. According to Kelly Brodie, the former Director of victim compensation programs in Iowa and California:

“… I didn’t think I would ever work in compensation because I had very hard feelings about the compensation program as a result of my work in the victim assistance field. And it was only through chance that I ended up in compensation…I thought I never wanted to work in this particular arena because I saw compensation as a bureaucratic structure…that was almost a payment for a prosecution-oriented, very adversarial process for victims.”

Later, compensation administrators often became articulate advocates of society’s responsibilities to victims.

The Women’s Movement There is little doubt that the women’s movement was central to the development of a victims’ movement. Their leaders saw sexual assault and domestic violence – and the poor response of the criminal justice system – as potent illustrations of a woman’s lack of status, power, and influence.

Denise Snyder, Director of the Washington, D.C., Rape Crisis Center, reflects that “…if you go back 30 years ago when the [Rape Crisis] Center first started,…the silence was deafening. This issue was one that society didn’t want to think about, didn’t want to hear about. The individual survivors felt incredible isolation.”

Long-time victim advocate Janice Rench of Massachusetts describes the influences that propelled her into the victims’ movement:

“It was not by accident [that I joined the movement]. That was my passion, having been a victim of a sexual assault crime. I wanted to right a wrong…we have to step back…when I started, it was a time of excitement, it was a time of passion….We didn’t have any plans, any books…but as we listened to the victims, we certainly got a

The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement (continued)

2 0 0 5 N C V R W R E S O U R C E G U I D E2

sense of what was going to work and what wasn’t. And so it was the victims themselves, I believe, that really started this field and certainly it was the sexual assault field in the ‘70s that did it.”

The new feminists immediately saw the need to provide special care to victims of rape and domestic violence. It is significant that of the first three victim assistance programs in the United States all began in 1972, and two were rape crisis centers (in Washington, D.C., and the San Francisco Bay area). There were several significant contributions that these programs brought to the victims’ movement:

1. Emotional crisis was recognized as a critical part of the injury inflicted.

2. Intervenors learned to help victims with the practical consequences of rebuilding their lives, rather than relying on a criminal justice system where they were too often maltreated.

3. In the absence of any resources, there was a heavy reliance on volunteers.

The Criminal Justice System Victimology in the 1970s helped to buttress what the public already knew – that crime was at unacceptably high levels and its victims were neglected. One individual who helped transform this problem into a reformed system was Donald E. Santarelli, Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in 1974. He had read the then-new research by Frank Cannavale(7) that documented this stunning finding: the largest cause of prosecution failure was the loss of once-cooperative witnesses who simply stopped helping a justice system that was indifferent to their most basic needs.

This was the catalyst for funding three demonstration projects in 1974 to provide better notification and support to victims and witnesses. “We were the prototype for the victim/witness programs in District Attorneys’ offices,” recalls Norm Early, the former District Attorney of Denver, Colorado. “Back then, everything was very rudimentary. It was basically notification, setting up waiting rooms for people so that you wouldn’t have ‘World War II’ in the hallway between the defendant’s family and the victim’s family as we

often did back in the old days.”

Some of the victim/witness programs began borrowing service ideas from the grassroots programs and new ones based in law enforcement; some of the prosecutor-based staff received training in crisis intervention (because court appearances can be crisis- inducing events), and a few offered on-scene crisis services to victims whether or not there was an arrest and prosecution. Most began making referrals to social service and victim compensation programs. Notification went beyond telling victims about their next court date – it led to establishing on-call systems, and then obtaining and considering victims’ views on bail determinations, continuances, plea bargains, dismissals, sentences, restitution, protective measures, and parole hearings. Some offered employer and creditor intercession, as well as support during court appearances. Many of these innovations were documented in a landmark “Prescriptive Package” commissioned by LEAA.(8)

In 1974, LEAA grants to the Ft. Lauderdale Police Department and then the Indianapolis Police Department helped open this new sector of the movement. Others followed suit. Many of the police- based programs were inspired by the work of two men.

A one-time New York police officer, Martin Symonds, became a psychiatrist specializing in treating trauma victims and later became the Director of Psychological Services for the New York City Police Department (“I finally got my gold shield,” he would brag). In his clinical work with victims that began in 1971, Dr. Symonds developed three insights:

1. The pattern of responses from victims of trauma was similar regardless of the type of crime.

2. The principles of good crisis intervention are also similar.

3. Law enforcement officers are in the position of doing the most harm or the most good in responding to victims.

These views were published in a number of journals and were spread around the victim assistance community.

The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement (continued)

32 0 0 5 N C V R W R E S O U R C E G U I D E

Dr. Morton Bard – also a one-time member of “New York’s finest” – was a psychologist who taught at New York University and who also studied the reactions of crime victims. With an LEAA grant, he published two volumes on Domestic Violence and Crisis Intervention. He laid the basis for presenting victim-focused training into many law enforcement academies and the FBI National Academy. His Crime Victim’s Book,(9) published in 1979, was the first book-length primer on identifying and meeting victims’ needs and was considered a “bible” for many advocates and crime victims alike.

The Growth of Victim Activism Finally, the victims’ movement was given a jolt of energy from crime victims and survivors. The victims’ movement surfaced the neglected issue of criminal violence against women, yet it was rape survivors and battered women who most commonly founded programs and shelters for similar victims. An additional force began to be felt in the late 1970s.

As lonely and isolated as other victims felt, survivors of homicide victims were truly “invisible.” As one homicide victim’s mother said, “When I wanted to talk about my son, I soon found that murder is a taboo subject in our society. I found, to my surprise, that nice people apparently just don’t get killed.”(10)

Families and Friends of Missing Persons was organized in 1974 in Washington state by survivors of homicide victims. The initial purpose was simply to provide support to others whose loved ones were missing or murdered. It later evolved into an advocacy group as well.

Parents Of Murdered Children was founded by Charlotte and Robert Hullinger in 1978 in the aftermath of the murder of their daughter by her ex-boyfriend. Mothers Against Drunk Driving was co-founded in 1980 by Candy Lightner when her daughter was killed by a repeat offender drunk driver, and by Cindi Lamb, whose infant daughter was rendered a quadriplegic by a repeat offender drunk driver. In 1977, Protect the Innocent in Indiana was energized when Betty Jane Spencer joined after she was attacked in her home and her four boys were killed. She and others did not shy away from the news media.

According to Cindi Lamb, “Probably one of the foremost strategies is giving the victim a face, and the face of the victim was [in her case, her quadriplegic infant daughter] Laura Lamb. She was the poster child for Mothers Against Drunk Driving, because even though she couldn’t move, she moved so many people.”

Many of these were support groups, but most were also advocacy groups whose power was undeniable. Edith Surgan, whose daughter was killed in New York City in 1976, moved to New Mexico and founded the New Mexico Crime Victim Assistance Organization that was the driving force behind establishing victim compensation legislation in that state. She told many times of traveling day after day from her home in Albuquerque to Santa Fe to fight for that legislation. She also told of how the Majority Leader of the Senate hid from her until she confronted him and asked why he was hiding. He said simply that he could not deal with such a horrible issue.

Bob Preston, whose daughter Wendy was murdered in Florida, along with Greg Novak, whose sister Beverly Ann Novak was murdered in Chicago by a man who had just been released, unsupervised, from a State Hospital, co-founded Justice for Victims, which successfully lobbied for one of the first state constitutional amendments for victims’ rights that was passed in Florida in 1988. Preston today co-chairs the National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network.

The experience of John W. Gillis, Director of the Office for Victims of Crime, following the murder of his daughter Louarna in Los Angeles in 1979, captured the work of all these groups:

“Quite frankly, Parents Of Murdered Children saved my life…because it gave me an opportunity to talk about what had happened….So I attended their meetings. They started asking me questions about law enforcement [he was then a Los Angeles police lieutenant] and why cases were handled certain ways. This was really helpful to me because then I found out I was providing help and information to others who were really hurting so much. So it was a two-way street. From there a group of us decided that we wanted to start our own organization, so we started Justice for Homicide Victims.”

The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement (continued)

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These five forces worked together at first in informal coalitions, but the formation of the National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) in 1975 helped to consolidate the purposes and goals of the victims’ movement. The organization grew out of ideas developed at the first national conference on victim assistance, sponsored by LEAA, in Ft. Lauderdale in 1973. NOVA’s initial contributions were to promote networking and to continue national conferences (beginning in 1976) to provide training opportunities for those working with victims.

Funding to the field in the late 1970s through LEAA gave communities opportunities to replicate the initial programs and begin to translate knowledge and practice into educational materials. The National District Attorneys Association developed a Committee on Victims to assist in disseminating information. The American Bar Association established a Victims Committee in its Criminal Justice Section.

By the end of the 1970s, many states had at least a few victim assistance programs, and 10 states had networks of programs. There grew a common understanding of the basic elements of service: crisis intervention, counseling, support during criminal justice proceedings, compensation and restitution. LEAA continued to promote victim assistance through its state block grants and established the first National Victim Resource Center in 1978.

In 1980, NOVA incorporated the growing demand for victims to have legitimate access to the justice system into a new policy platform on victims’ rights and the initiation of a National Campaign for Victim Rights, which had as its core, a National Victims’ Rights Week, endorsed and implemented in 1981 by President Ronald W. Reagan.

The 1970s were marked by rapid progress as well as by turbulence, caused in significant part by the waning of federal financial support. As national priorities shifted, stable funding became elusive when Congress de- funded LEAA at the end of the decade, and programs often entered into internecine warfare over the limited resources that were available.

Controversy also arose among programs that were driven by grassroots energy and those that were based in criminal justice institutions. Many felt there was an inherent conflict between the goals of a prosecutor or law enforcement agency and the interests of crime victims. Some sought legal changes in the system, while others felt change could take place through the adjustment of policies and procedures.

Tensions within the movement led to the emergence of new national organizations: the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault was formed at NOVA’s 1978 national conference to provide leadership for rape crisis programs. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence was also founded in 1978 to provide an advocacy network for shelters.

Victim advocate Janice Rench lamented the frictions that arose:

“[In the 1970s] there was much more openness for domestic violence victim advocates, for sexual assault advocates to come together, and then we would have people who had lost their children – homicide survivors – and we would start to see that there was more to this than just sexual assault and domestic violence – but that came later.”

The 1980s: Growth and Acceptance The loss of significant LEAA funding in 1979 served as a potent reminder of how tenuous the movement’s gains in the 1970s had been. Though an untold number of programs were abolished, the movement itself survived, thanks largely to the impact of the victim activist groups and the new public awareness they engendered. Their influence helped the victims’ movement keep going and make progress on three fronts: public policy, program implementation, and public awareness.

State public officials, urged on by victim advocates, realized that state action was necessary to ensure the institutionalization of victim assistance. California again was a leader as it became the first state to establish state funding for victim assistance in 1980. Wisconsin took action by becoming the first state to pass a Victims’ Bill of Rights the same year.

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Jo Kolanda, the former Director of the Victim/Witness Program in the office of the District Attorney in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, shares her perspective of Wisconsin’s initial legislative efforts to benefit victims of crime:

“I said, ‘I think that the only way this program is going to survive is if there is statutory authority for the program. There’s got to be funding built in from the State. The State supports the court system, they should be willing to fund this.’ And every single person in the room laughed. At first I was so humiliated, and then I was so mad that I left that meeting thinking there is going to be statutory authority for this program or I will die trying.”

“I contacted a woman named Barbara Ulichny, who was at the time a freshman State Representative in Wisconsin.…I said, ‘You know, Barbara, we need a Victim/Witness Bill of Rights.’…Amazingly, a freshman Representative pulled this off…”

Spirits were raised by the receptivity of the new administration. In 1981, President Reagan declared National Victims’ Rights Week and Attorney General William French Smith launched a Task Force on Violent Crime. Conservative activist, victim advocate, and victims’ rights attorney Frank Carrington – and his old friend, Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese – were the catalysts.

According to Steve Twist, board member of the National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network:

“Frank was quite an advocate, even in the early ‘70s, for fundamental reforms of the criminal justice system so that it would become more victim- centered. Frank went on to be the driving force behind the establishment of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime…and it was Frank’s friendship with Ed Meese that led to that, and led to Frank being appointed as one of the members of the Task Force.”

From the movement’s perspective, the most important recommendation of the Attorney General’s Task Force, suggested by Frank Carrington, was to commission a Presidential Task Force on Victims of Crime. In 1982, the President implemented that recommendation. At the same time, Senator H. John Heinz discovered and

endorsed the principle of rights for victims through his work as chair of the Senate Aging Committee. The informal group that was invited to help Senator Heinz draft the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 will always remember his charge, “Help me find the most imaginative and effective tools ensuring victim rights in the states, and I’ll put them in the Federal bill.”(11)

While victim advocates cheered his bill when it won a unanimous consent vote on October 12, 1982, they also saw the Act for what it was – a first step toward comprehensive federal action on behalf of victims everywhere.

Lois Haight Herrington was an unknown quantity to the victims’ movement when she was appointed to chair the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982. However, a few advocates in California who had seen her perform as a prosecutor, were ecstatic.

As Harold Boscovich, former Director of the Victim Assistance Division of the Alameda County (California) District Attorney’s Office, recalls:

“I was happy when Lois went to Washington. But when she went to Washington she wasn’t going to take a job at the Office for Victims of Crime – it didn’t exist. Lois was going back to Washington with her husband…The next thing I heard from her is ‘I’ve got a job. I’ve been asked to head the Office of Justice Programs.’ And I was just elated.”

She became the indefatigable champion of victim justice, the architect of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA), and the architect of a Program Management Team for Victims of Crime which later evolved into the Office for Victims of Crime within the U.S. Department of Justice.

Stories of Haight Herrington’s tenacity are legendary. First as Chair of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime and later as the first Assistant Attorney General for the Office for Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, she wielded her powers of diplomacy, cajolery, and personal stature within the administration to fashion and implement the recommendations of the Task Force. Her passion for the cause was demonstrated when her husband took the oath as President Reagan’s Secretary of Energy; she

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surreptitiously held his bible open at the “Good Samaritan” parable instead of the psalm John Herrington had chosen.

Then Washington State Attorney General Kenneth Eikenberry, another member of the Task Force, secured his place in the history of the victims’ movement by pressing a recommendation that was novel to the movement – the adoption of a federal constitutional amendment for victims’ rights. Dr. Marlene Young, Executive Director of NOVA, relates this story:

“I will always remember sitting next to Ken at the lunch break during the first Task Force hearing and listening to him say, ‘I don’t know why everyone is so anxious about the status and treatment of victims.’ I sighed, thinking that he just didn’t get it, when he added, ‘All we have to do is pass a constitutional amendment that gives them the right to be present and heard in the criminal justice process.’ I was stunned by the idea.”(8)

The President’s Task Force held six hearings across the Nation and produced a Final Report with 68 recommendations to improve assistance to victims of crime. Lois Haight Herrington’s memories of one special occasion is telling, since it reflects part of her strategy in helping to get the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) passed:

“[This photograph] is when we’re giving our Task Force Report to the President…the next picture is the first Rose Garden ceremony…the reason I’m showing you this is that here are…victims that we had [with us]. Here was the President, the Vice President, and Attorney General Smith.…telling these stories and introducing these people to the President. I think [this meeting with the victims] was very instrumental in getting the Victims of Crime Act that I think has helped start so much of this.”

The Task Force’s Report launched four critical initiatives. First, it recommended federal legislation to fund state victim compensation programs and local victim assistance programs. That pair of recommendations was the precipitating force for the enactment of VOCA. The Act established the Crime Victims Fund, made up of federal criminal fines, penalties, forfeitures, and special assessments, as the resource for the two programs.

As Reverend Bob Denton, Executive Director of the Victim Assistance Program in Akron, Ohio, recalls:

“One of the good things that happened…is that we were able to strategically think through and use our experience to develop the procedures as well as the policies in distributing VOCA and state monies.… One of the things that killed us in ‘76 and ‘77 and ‘78 was the death of LEAA. We had just begun to get money into victim programs when they were killed. I sat in on one of the early research projects that the Justice Department did that found that we had dropped from 400 and some programs in this country to 200 and some in a couple weeks.”

“So, VOCA comes along and it says this is to keep those old programs from going down, because if they go down, we have nothing. And then, to build new programs.”

Second, it made recommendations to professionals in the criminal justice system and associated professions about how they could improve treatment to crime victims. The 1983 National Conference on the Judiciary and Victim Rights was a spinoff of the report and served as a major impetus to change judicial policies and attitudes.

South Dakota Judge Merton Tice, who attended the 1983 conference, said: “It was like seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. When Edith Surgan and Sunny Strong spoke [Ms. Surgan, a homicide survivor, spoke by speakerphone from her deathbed in Albuquerque; Ms. Strong, a rape survivor, addressed the conference in person], I knew there was something that needed to be done. The judicial branch of government should always be neutral, but neutrality does not mean that one side is forgotten. In this case, it was the victim that had been forgotten.”(12)

Third, it recommended the creation of an additional Task Force on violence within families, which resulted in the establishment of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence in 1983 with a Report published in 1984. That Report was a stimulus to a VOCA amendment requiring compensation programs to make victims of domestic violence eligible for help.

Fourth, it recommended the “Eikenberry amendment” to the U.S. Constitution. That recommendation led to the

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1986 formation of the National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network (NVCAN), which initially sought to obtain state-level amendments for crime victims’ rights.

In the four years after the publication of the Final Report, the Office of Justice Programs and the Office for Victims of Crime worked closely with outside groups, notably NOVA, to implement the recommendations. States began receiving VOCA funds in 1986, training programs for justice professionals were disseminated widely, standards for service for victim programs were developed, and regional training for victim service providers was offered across the Nation.

During this time in the academic field, the first Victim Services Certificate Program was offered through California State University, Fresno. Now in addition to the Certificate, students can also earn a Bachelor of Science in Criminology Degree with a Major in Victimology.

Victim-oriented justice gained international recognition with the adoption of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power in 1985. This document helped spur other nations to start or expand victim rights and services. As Irvin Waller, Professor, University of Ottawa, relates:

“What we decided to do was to take the so-called rights for victims, which were really principles of justice for victims in various states and nations, and put these into a proposal that we then took to the Secretary of the United Nations.”

The development of the OVC/NOVA Model Victim Assistance Program Brief in 1986-1988 served as a management tool for programs. It articulated eight basic services that programs should provide: crisis intervention, counseling and advocacy, support during criminal investigations, support during prosecution, support after case disposition, crime prevention, public education, and training of allied professions.

States were also moving rapidly to institutionalize victim assistance through funding legislation and the development of program networks. Bills of rights were adopted in every state by 1990; at present, 32 states have adopted constitutional amendments, and there are more than 32,000 statutes that define and protect victims’ rights nationwide. By the end of the 1980s,

more than 8,000 victim service programs were in operation.

The 1980s brought new contributors to the crime victims’ movement.

• The National Victim Center (now the National Center for Victims of Crime) was founded in 1985 in honor of Sunny von Bulow, and generated increased emphasis on media and public awareness of victims’ rights and concerns; research on the impact of crime on victims; civil litigation on behalf of victims; and training about victim assistance organizational development and crime victims’ legislative rights.

• The Victims’ Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) became prominent as its founder, Frank Carrington, helped to develop and promote civil litigation on behalf of crime victims.

• The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children was established in 1984 to help find missing children and provide support to their families.

• The International Association of Chiefs of Police established a Victims Committee and announced a “law enforcement bill of rights for victims.”

• The American Correctional Association Victims Committee issued 16 recommendations to improve victims’ rights and services in the post-sentencing phases of criminal cases.

• The American Probation and Parole Association established a Victim Issues Committee and developed sample policies and procedures, as well as extensive training curricula, relevant to victims’ rights and needs when their offenders are sentenced to community supervision or released on parole.

• The Spiritual Dimension in Victim Services became a source of education and training for clergy on victim issues.

• Neighbors Who Care was initiated by Justice Fellowship to develop victim assistance within religious communities.

• The International Society of Traumatic Stress Studies and the International Association of Trauma Counselors were established to serve as research and education resources for individuals working in the field of trauma.

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The growth of the understanding of trauma was particularly important during the 1980s. Drawing on the experiences of seasoned crisis intervenors, NOVA initiated a practical model for community crisis intervention in the aftermath of tragedy that affects large groups of people. Its first crisis response team was fielded in 1986 after the mass murders committed in the Edmond, Oklahoma, Post Office. The success of that effort engendered the National Crisis Response Project, which made trained volunteer crisis intervenors available to address the emotional impact of crime and other disasters. It also influenced the growth of new local and state networks of crisis response teams.

The 1990s and Beyond The 1990s brought depth and maturation to the field. OVC continued to provide not only funding, but also leadership and vision to the field. As new areas of need were identified, OVC created a number of field-initiated projects that highlighted “promising practices” that were worthy of replication.

One may track the events of the decade under the following headings: the new contributions of research to practice; advances in responding to individual trauma victims as well as to groups of people subjected to the same traumatic event; the expansion and deepening of services to underserved victim populations; and the worldwide movement to articulate the rights of victims in the justice system and to adopt measures to enforce those rights.

Research Contributions and Advances in Responding to Victims No one in the early victims’ movement would have turned to neurobiologists to chart their future. That has changed. Research into how the brain processes trauma has shed light on why victims are vulnerable to such lasting disabilities as posttraumatic stress disorder – but more importantly, how trauma victims, usually with help, can mitigate and sometimes master the unwelcome changes inflicted on them.

The research affirms a basic tool of crisis counseling – to permit or even encourage the victim to “ventilate,” to “tell their story.” It now guides the intervenor to ask a set of questions about the event, in chronological order, that help victims organize their thoughts and reactions, and help them to name them in a cohesive whole. This

approach to “structured ventilation,” seeking to implant a “cognitive narrative” where a fractured set of memories resides, often provides a needed balm to the sufferer.

The 1990s also saw the expansion of programs offering crisis intervention to groups of people affected by the same disaster. There emerged a number of different approaches for providing “group crisis interventions” or “debriefings” and while researchers continue to raise questions about the effectiveness of some of these approaches in some circumstances, proponents of “crisis response teams” remain committed to properly adapting the crisis intervention services, which are offered to many thousands of victims every day, to victims too numerous to reach on just an individual basis.

A variant of this service is now used in “family assistance centers” where disaster managers provide one-stop applications for a host of services available to victims of natural disasters or man-made catastrophes such as the attacks of September 11, 2001. Crisis counselors have stepped in to accompany incoming family members through all the service agencies present. Since that journey can take up to 8 hours or longer, having a “companion” skilled in dealing with distressed people makes the experience far more gratifying.

In 1995, OVC first supported the National Victim Assistance Academy (NVAA) sponsored by the Victims’ Assistance Legal Organization. The NVAA includes a research-based 40-hour curriculum on victimology, victims’ rights, and myriad other topics; as of 2003, 2,000 students from every state and territory, as well as from seven other nations, have graduated from the NVAA. In 1998, OVC co-funded the first State Victim Assistance Academy in Michigan. Subsequently, OVC has funded an additional 18 State Academies. In 1999, Colorado, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah received first-year funding. In 2002, Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, and Oregon received first-year funding. In 2003, Georgia, Illinois, and New York received first-year funding. In 2004, California, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Tennessee received first-year funding.

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Expanding and Deepening Victim Services It is well to remember that in the middle of the 20th century, the term “child abuse” had not been coined – much less transformed into a specialized set of medical and social service innovations. “Child sexual abuse” was even slower to be recognized as a significant subset of child victimization. “Domestic violence” may have been used to occasionally describe the “domestics” police agencies responded to by the millions – but in the main, domestic violence was perceived as a family problem, not a crime, much less a violent crime. “Stalking” was a descriptor, to be sure, but not of a common, terrifying crime – until the victims’ movement made it so, with all 50 states and the District of Columbia adopting anti-stalking laws in 1990 and 1991. “Identity theft” was an unknown term and a nonexistent problem before the “Information Age” emerged in the 1990s. Other new crimes, such as telemarketing fraud and cybercrime, arose as a result of the “Information Age.”

To its credit, the victims’ movement has always been fast to recognize patterns of predation that had been overlooked by society, and has tried to respond as quickly to its victims. In the 1990s, the movement began to put technology in service to its ideals.

• The National Victim Center, with support from OVC, sponsored the first national conference on technologies that benefit crime victims in 1998.

• The National Domestic Violence Hotline, established by Congress with strong support from the movement, received more than a million calls from its February 1996 inception though August 2003.

• “Victim Information and Notification Everyday” (VINE) is a proprietary system that, by 2003, provided 36 states and 20 of the Nation’s largest metropolitan areas a method by which victims can call a toll-free number to obtain timely information about criminal cases and the status of their incarcerated offenders, and receive advance notice of those inmates’ change of status, including a scheduled release from custody, by telephone or via the Web.

• OVC’s Victim Services 2000 projects have proven that, with the cooperation of all agencies and aid from innovative technologies, a system can be created that offers a “seamless web” of services where “there are

no wrong doors” for victims to enter into a responsive network of help.

• The Violence Intervention Program, located at the Los Angeles County and USC Medical Center, implemented the first telemedicine project to guarantee that remote areas within the United States and around the world have access to expert evaluations and quality case assessments to protect the rights of victims.

Fueling this progress was the unsteady but substantial increase in revenues into, and grants out of, VOCA’s Crime Victims Fund. From 1990 through 1995, deposits of federal fines ranged between $128 million and $234 million. A large fine paid by Daiwa Bank in 1996 caused the Fund to rise to nearly $530 million the next year. The statute’s “shock absorber” – the state victim assistance administrators’ authority to pay out any one year’s grant over a 4-year span – made the big increase manageable. Three years later, however, deposits jumped to nearly $1 billion, and even as OVC and its constituents pondered how to manage this new windfall, Congress stepped in by imposing a $500 million spending cap (holding the balance in reserve). Congress maintained the use of caps in the years following, with the amount creeping up in most years.

The movement’s disappointment over the cap was tempered by the relative stability of the Fund at about twice the level it enjoyed at the start of the decade. Plainly, the trend of providing ever more services to a larger number of victims continued.

Still, the movement’s progress of reaching those in need was often slow. Indeed, by the 1990s, there were effective services available in some communities heretofore underserved – communities defined by type of crime (homicide, domestic violence among partners); communities defined by geography (low-income urban dwellers and those in rural, remote, or frontier regions of the Nation), or communities within the larger community (immigrants and residents of Indian Reservations, as examples); and communities defined by the age of the offender (the needs and rights of victims of juvenile offenders were identified and addressed in a comprehensive 1994 report published by the American Correctional Association Victims Committee that asserted that “crime victims should not

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be discriminated against based upon the age of their offenders.”)

“Progress” in reaching the underserved too often meant establishing prototypes and “best practices” that still reached a minority of the victims. The pattern continues: there are not enough resources for victim services of any type of hard-to-reach populations.

The exception was the Federal Government’s 1994 commitment to preventing violence against women and helping its victims. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) packaged some 30 grant programs – a substantial amount aimed at the scourge of domestic violence – with an initial authorization of almost $1 billion dollars over five years. While VAWA advocates experienced some disappointments in the way the programs were designed and focused, they generally took pride in the fact that annual appropriations usually came close to the dollar ceilings authorized, and that the 2000 reenactment (“VAWA II”) included many improvements they had sought.

The Ongoing March for Victims’ Rights At least from the 1980s, the appeal for “victims’ rights” came from victims and survivors who felt they had been maltreated by the justice system. Yet from the outset, they had cogent allies among victim advocates who had seen and heard what the system had done to their clients and were outraged. The sense of injustice felt by victims and their advocates in America resonated with their counterparts worldwide.

Supporters of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power were encouraged by the reception the Declaration had received, and so through the 1990s came together to craft the “Guide for Policy Makers on the Implementation” of the Declaration and the “Handbook on Justice for Victims” to spur the development of victim assistance programs in support of the Declaration. Years in the making, these documents were finally published in 1999, with the support of OVC.

Victims’ rights and assistance were made integral to United Nations war crimes trials and to such special justice initiatives as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A latent victims’ right in France to have the victim’s civil claims against a

defendant concurrently considered during the criminal trial revived the “civil party” in prosecutions – with the victim’s lawyer in court, who could now be provided for free by a legal aid attorney. In Germany, the victim’s right to have an attorney in court to speak to all the victim’s interests effectively made the victim a “third party” in the case, with independent rights to question witnesses, call one’s own witnesses, and even appeal rulings and decisions, including sentences, in critical cases.

In the United States, victim advocates did not seek so central a role for victims in the justice system. What they did seek – the rights of victims at least to be present and heard at critical decision points in the prosecution – they pursued vigorously. By the early 1990s, several states had adopted constitutional amendments to insure such rights. By decade’s end, 32 states had so changed their constitutional charters. During this time, the advocates returned to support their ultimate goal – the adoption of such an amendment in the U.S. Constitution. In April 1996, their campaign moved ahead with the introduction of a bipartisan Senate resolution, authored by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), to propose such an amendment. In the next month, a federal victims’ rights constitutional amendment was endorsed by the U.S. President.

Yet when the Feinstein-Kyl proposal came up for debate on the Senate floor in April 2000, no consensus had been reached with the Clinton Administration on the fine points of the resolution, and so it was withdrawn.

That was no longer an issue upon the 2001 inauguration of George W. Bush as President, who by April of the next year had endorsed the specific language of the revised Feinstein-Kyl resolution.

Yet, on the eve of their second attempt to get a Senate vote on the amendment, in April 2004, the Senators found they did not have the necessary votes for passage – but they did detect interest among opponents in adopting a tough victims’ rights statute. What was quietly fashioned – then adopted in a 96-to-1 Senate vote, and then slightly altered by the House before winning final Congressional approval – is remarkable in two ways.

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First, the “Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act” (honoring five homicide victims whose loved ones became champions of the victims’ rights movement) contains what is by now a standard litany of eight victim rights for victims of federal crimes – but has enforcement provisions found in no other such statute in the United States. And second, it authorizes funding, including for the establishment of free legal clinics for victims, seeking to make sure the law is fully implemented.

Conclusion In the early 1980s, the survival of the crime victims’ movement was in jeopardy. By the late 1990s, that was no longer true. Victims’ rights and services were part of the social service and criminal justice practices. Yet to the “veterans” who lived through that period, the major transformation of the 1980s represented uncertain progress.

Many victim/witness programs have become so institutionalized that assistant prosecutors wouldn’t know how to try a case without such staff.

Yet the “routine” operations of many victim service agencies have many of the movement’s veterans fearing that yesterday’s advocates will become tomorrow’s bureaucrats. Indeed, this was an almost unanimous concern expressed by the senior victim advocates who were interviewed by the OVC Oral History Project for this publication.

“Victims’ rights and services” have become part of the common lexicon, such that many of today’s victims expect respectful and compassionate treatment as a matter of course. It is surely the case that victim services are reaching more people than before, and that more justice officials are honoring crime victims’ rights.

It is also true that each year, tens of thousands of domestic violence victims are denied temporary shelter for lack of space – to cite just one index of the insufficiency of services. And it is also true that, from the available evidence, victims’ rights are more often ignored than honored during criminal prosecutions.

Thanks to the influx of large fine collections, VOCA helped to significantly expand state compensation and local service programs–but Congress imposed spending caps and earmarks on VOCA’s Crime Victims Fund–a trust fund victim advocates had thought was sacrosanct.

The crime victims’ rights movement has matured and become a respected partner in our Nation’s community of social and criminal justice services. Yet the ideals of the movement have yet to be fully realized. There remain significant challenges to overcome before crime victims can be certain of a fair and compassionate response to their plight. For those who brought it into being, the victims’ movement is required to keep moving forward if its mission is to be realized. The continued shared vision and values that promote equal rights for victims of crime will undoubtedly guide this mission.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS John Stein, JD, served as Vice President of the board of the National Organization for Victim Assistance from 1979-1981. In 1981, he became NOVA’s Deputy Director, a position he still holds today. He has been a national victim advocate for more than 30 years.

Marlene Young, Ph.D., JD, is a founding member, and former President, of the National Organization for Victim Assistance and has served as Executive Director since 1981. She has been a national victim advocate for more than 30 years.

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Endnotes

1. See, as examples: a. Mendelssohn, B. 1946. “New bio-psycho-social horizons:

victimology.” Unpublished report. This appears to be the first official designation of “victimology,” although Mendelssohn traces the evolution of the term to his first study: Mendelssohn, B. 1937. “Method to be used by counsel for the defence in the researches made into the personality of the criminal.” Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie, Bruxelles, aout-sept-oct., p. 877.

b. von Hentig, H. 1948. The Criminal and His Victim, Studies in the Sociology of Crime. New Haven: Yale University Press.

c. Ellenberger, H. 1954. “Relations psychologiques entre le criminel et sa victime.” Revue internale de criminology et de police technique 2(8): 121.

2. Schafer, Stephen. 1968. The Victim and His Criminal: A Study in Functional Responsibility. New York: Random House.

3. Schafer, Stephen. 1965. “Criminal-Victim Relationship in Violent Crimes.” Unpublished research. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, MH-07058.

4. See these: a. Biderman, A.D., L.A. Johnson, J. McIntyre and A.W. Weir. 1967.

Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes Toward Law Enforcement. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Field Surveys I. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

b. Ennis, P.H. 1967. Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Field Surveys II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

c. Reiss, A.J., Jr. 1967. Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Field Surveys III. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

d. Hindelang, M.J. 1976. Criminal Victimization in Eight American Cities: A Descriptive Analysis of Common Theft and Assault. Cambridge: Ballinger.

e. Hindelang, M.J., M.R. Gottfredson and J. Garofalo. 1978. Victims of Personal Crimes: An Empirical Foundation for a Theory of Victimization. Cambridge: Ballinger.

5. Hindelang, M.J. 1982. “Victimization Surveying, Theory and Research.” The Victim in International Perspective. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.

6. Goldberg, A.J. 1970. “Preface: Symposium on Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence.” Southern California Law Review 43(1970).

7. Cannavale, Frank J. Jr. and William D. Falcon, editor. 1976. Witness Cooperation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

8. Stein, J.S. and R. White. 1977. “Better Services for Crime Victims.” Unpublished volume in the “Prescriptive Package” series. U.S. Department of Justice, Grant Number 76-NI-99-0021.

9. Bard, Morton and Dawn Sangrey. 1979. The Crime Victim’s Book. New York: Brunner/Mazel.

10. Harrington, L. H. (Chair) 1982. President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

11. NOVA archive documents, 1997.

12. Judge Merton Tice, NOVA archive documents, 1997.

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Shoulder tap crime, based on the typical manner a request by a minor for an adult to buy alcohol occurs

https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/2900/2964/

Shoulder Tap Crime

Most states make it a crime to purchase alcohol for a minor, sometimes called the shoulder tap crime, based on the typical manner a request by a minor for an adult to buy alcohol occurs. These crimes generally do not require proof that the defendant knew the person was underage.

·         Should the same strict liability apply to a host of a party that is attended by both adults and minors, where alcohol at the private party is furnished to both?

·         Should a host be able to offer evidence that he reasonably believed the minor was old enough to drink?

·         Would it help your case if the jurisdiction made such a defense available to bars and liquor stores that required buyers to provide proof of age?

·         Use the following case to help guide your analysis:

California Criminal Jury Instructions

Your analysis should be a minimum of two pages in length and follow APA formatting and citation guidelines.

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Linking Structural Characteristics to Crime in

Socially Disorganized Communities

1

Social Disorganization Theory’s Greatest Challenge: Linking Structural Characteristics to Crime in

Socially Disorganized Communities

Charis E. Kubrin and James C. Wo

The Handbook of Criminological Theory, First Edition. Edited by Alex R. Piquero. © 2016 John Wiley &

Sons, Inc. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [pp. 121 – 136]

Why do some neighborhoods have higher crime rates than others? What is it about certain communities

that consistently generate high crime rates? These are the central questions of interest for social

disorganization theory, a macro‐level perspective concerned with explaining the spatial distribution of

crime across areas. Social disorganization theory has emerged as the critical framework for understanding

the relationship between community characteristics and crime in urban areas. According to the theory,

certain neighborhood characteristics – most notably poverty, residential instability, and racial

heterogeneity – can lead to social disorganization. Social disorganization, in turn, can cause crime. In this

chapter, we first describe social disorganization theory, laying out the theory’s key principles and

propositions. We then discuss one of the most serious and enduring challenges confronting the theory –

identifying and empirically verifying the social interactional mechanisms that link structural characteristics

of communities, such as poverty and residential instability, to heightened crime rates in socially

disorganized communities. And finally, we present some promising new directions for the theory by

discussing several theoretical concepts that may be useful for scholars interested in identifying and

measuring the theory’s interactional mechanisms; these include social capital, collective efficacy, and

social networks. We conclude the chapter with some remarks about one additional important theoretical

direction for social disorganization theory: incorporating the role of neighborhood subculture in

explanations of crime and delinquency.

The origins of social disorganization theory date back to the early 1900s. In 1929, two researchers from

the University of Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, began a series of studies using official records

which showed that in the city of Chicago, rates of delinquency, criminality, and commitment to

correctional institutions varied markedly by area. In particular, rates were highest in slums near the city

center and diminished as distance from the center of the city increased, except in areas of industry and

commerce just outside of the central district, which had some of the highest rates.

Shaw and McKay also found that rates of crime and delinquency exhibited a remarkable consistent

patterning over many decades; in particular, the spatial pattern of rates revealed significant long‐term

stability even though the nationality structure of the population in the inner‐city areas changed greatly

over time. Shaw and McKay thus determined that crime and delinquency were not the result of personal

characteristics of the residents who lived in the neighborhoods but were tied to the neighborhoods

themselves. Since areas of high and low crime and delinquency maintained their relative positions over

many years, a key theoretical task became to explain the existence and stability of these area differentials

over time.

A fundamental part of their explanation involved the concept of social disorganization. Social

disorganization refers to the inability of a community to realize the common values of its members and

maintain effective social controls. As Kornhauser describes, “Social disorganization exists in the first

instance when the structure and culture of a community are incapable of implementing and expressing

the values of its own residents.” (Kornhauser, 1978:63) According to the theory, a common value among

2

neighborhood residents is the desire for a crime‐free community. In essence, then, socially disorganized

neighborhoods are ineffective in combating crime. A socially organized community is characterized by (1)

solidarity, or an internal consensus on essential norms and values (e.g., residents want and value the same

things, such as a crime‐free neighborhood); (2) cohesion, or a strong bond among neighbors (e.g.,

residents know and like one another); and (3) integration, with social interaction occurring on a regular

basis (e.g., residents spend time with one another).

Conversely, a disorganized community has little solidarity among residents and lacks social cohesion or

integration. Perhaps the greatest difference between socially organized and disorganized neighborhoods

is the levels of informal social control in those neighborhoods. Informal social control is defined as the

scope of collective intervention that the community directs toward local problems, including crime

(Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1969). It is the informal, nonofficial actions taken by residents to

combat crime in their communities, such as, for example, when residents question persons about

suspicious activity or admonish misbehaving youth and inform parents of their children’s misconduct. In

essence, residents act as the “eyes and ears” of the community and their informal surveillance, and even

simple presence, deters others from engaging in crime.

According to the theory, socially disorganized neighborhoods have lower levels of informal social control,

and thus experience higher crime rates when compared to more socially organized neighborhoods.

Ecological characteristics of neighborhoods influence the degree of social disorganization in the

community. This is because certain characteristics can impede the development of social ties that

promote the ability to solve common problems, including crime. Ecological characteristics of greatest

interest to social disorganization researchers include poverty, joblessness, population mobility or

turnover, racial composition, and family disruption, among others. Although community characteristics

such as poverty or residential instability are related to crime, these factors themselves do not directly

cause crime, according to the theory. That is, ecological characteristics are related to crime only indirectly

through various neighborhood processes such as informal social control. As such, poverty, residential

instability, and other ecological characteristics are important in as much as they affect the mediating

processes of social disorganization. In light of the above discussion, the basic social disorganization causal

model can be expressed as: neighborhood characteristics → social ties → informal social control → crime.

Sampson describes the processes by which neighborhood characteristics and crime are associated:

Neighborhood characteristics such as family disorganization, residential mobility, and structural density

weaken informal social control networks; informal social controls are impeded by weak local social bonds,

lowered community attachment, anonymity, and reduced capacity for surveillance and guardianship;

other factors such as poverty and racial composition also probably affect informal control, although their

influence is in all likelihood indirect; residents in areas characterized by family disorganization, mobility,

and building density are less able to perform guardianship activities, less likely to report general deviance

to authorities, to intervene in public disturbances, and to assume responsibility for supervision of youth

activities; the result is that deviance is tolerated and public norms of social control are not effective

(Sampson, 1987: 109).

Social Disorganization Theory’s Greatest Challenge

Like all other theories discussed in this volume, there are ongoing challenges facing social disorganization

theory, some of which have been resolved more fully than others. These challenges have been discussed

3

at length in two important assessments of the theory at different points in time: Bursik (1988) and Kubrin

& Weitzer (2003). Although these scholars identify several challenges, perhaps the greatest involves

identifying and measuring the social mechanisms that account for heightened crime rates in socially

disorganized neighborhoods. Stated alternatively, a major conceptual limitation of social disorganization

research is the relative lack of attention paid to the processes that mediate the effect of community

characteristics (see also Byrne & Sampson, 1986).

Given the primitive nature of data analysis during the early 1900s, it is not surprising that scholars were

unable to conduct sophisticated analyses that would allow them to fully test social disorganization

theory’s arguments. Early Chicago school theorists “tested” the theory by plotting the spatial distribution

of crime in the city to determine whether it was consistent with the theory’s predictions, and then

correlated characteristics of neighborhoods with crime rates. Studies were able to document, for

example, that poor, mobile, and racially heterogeneous neighborhoods had the highest crime rates but

they could not specify the mechanisms (e.g., social ties, informal social control) accounting for this

relationship. This was problematic, in part, because it did not allow researchers to rule out competing

theoretical explanations such as strain, which also theorize a poverty–crime association.

Even decades after the early work of Chicago School researchers, little progress had been made in this

area. Studies included the “front end” of social disorganization models, that is, attributes of the

community, as well as the “back end” or crime and delinquency outcomes, but continued to leave out the

crucial middle, or indicators reflecting how much social disorganization is occurring in a neighborhood

(Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009: 91).

Significant progress was finally achieved with the publication of Robert Sampson and Byron Groves’ 1989

study, which used data from a large national survey of Great Britain to formally test social disorganization

theory. Sampson & Groves (1989) constructed community‐level measures of neighborhoods (e.g., low

socio‐economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, family disruption, and urbanization) as

well as the mediating dimensions of social disorganization (e.g., sparse local friendship networks,

unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation) and determined how both sets

of measures impacted neighborhood crime rates. The findings were largely supportive of social

disorganization theory: communities characterized by strong social ties and informal control had lower

rates of crime and delinquency.

Moreover, these dimensions of social disorganization were found to explain, in large part, the effects of

community structural characteristics on crime rates. This latter finding was important because it verified

for the first time that the structural conditions themselves do not influence crime; rather, they are

important only inasmuch as they produce social disorganization. Despite this progress, only a handful of

studies (e.g., Elliott et al., 1996; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Warner & Rountree, 1997) have fully

documented the theoretical processes laid out by social disorganization theory. Perhaps more

importantly, the findings we do have from this small but critical literature suggest these processes may

not be so straightforward. An increasing finding emerging from the literature is that social ties may not

play the expected role (see Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003: 375–379). As such, researchers are only beginning to

fully identify, understand, and empirically verify the social interactional mechanisms that link structural

characteristics to crime in neighborhoods. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, in part, in the

remainder of the chapter we discuss some promising theoretical developments for social disorganization

theory.

4

Promising Theoretical Developments

For decades following the early Chicago School studies, research testing social disorganization theory, by

and large, emphasized the critical role of two theoretical constructs: social ties and informal social control,

as discussed earlier. In more recent years, however, scholars have begun to introduce additional

theoretical concepts that borrow from – but go well beyond – social ties and informal social control. These

include collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks. For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss

these promising new theoretical directions in social disorganization theory.

Collective efficacy

As noted earlier, Sampson and Groves (1989) incited renewed interest in social disorganization theory and

its ability to explain variations in community crime rates. Recall their argument emphasized the formation

and utility of social ties in terms of providing effective social action (i.e., informal social control) to fight

crime. In recent years, scholars have begun to suggest that perhaps dense social networks of strong ties

might not be sufficient, in and of themselves, to fulfill social control functions (Browning et al., 2004;

Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Pattillo, 1998; Sampson, 2006, Sampson et al., 1997, Venkatesh, 2000, 2006).

According to some, what appears to be missing is the key factor of purposive action, that is, just how ties

are activated and resources mobilized to enhance informal social control (Sampson et al., 1997). Sampson,

Raudenbush, & Earls (1997) address this deficiency in their formulation of the concept of collective

efficacy, which they define as, “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the

common good” (921). As is evident from the definition, collective efficacy integrates cohesion and mutual

trust among residents with a culturally‐derived neighborhood dynamic (i.e., shared expectations for

control). The concept advances previous theorizing by taking into account mechanisms of social action

that may be facilitated by, but do not necessarily require, an interconnected network of strong ties

(Sampson, 2006: 152). Since “efficacy” refers to the ability to achieve a desired effect or outcome, in the

context of the theory, collective efficacy is best conceptualized as a task‐specific concept that captures

the perceived ability of a neighborhood to solve crime problems. Importantly, there are two components

of collective efficacy.

The first component is the willingness of residents to intervene for the common good of the

neighborhood. Such willingness, according to Sampson and colleagues (1997), is a necessary precursor for

establishing informal social control, or the degree to which actual behaviors are undertaken by residents

as a means to address and prevent crime. To measure this component of collective efficacy, or the

willingness to intervene, in a survey (The Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, or

PHDCN Survey), Sampson and colleagues asked 8,782 residents of 343 neighborhoods in Chicago the

likelihood that their neighbors would intervene in the following (hypothetical) scenarios: (1) if children

were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; (2) if children were spray‐painting graffiti on a

local building; (3) if children were showing disrespect to an adult; (4) if a fight broke out in the front of

their house; and (5) if the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts. Respondents

answered using a five‐item Likert‐type scale. The assumption is that those neighborhoods that score high

on the collective willingness to intervene scale are more likely to actually intervene when faced with these

and similar situations, thereby reducing the likelihood for crime in those communities.

The second component of collective efficacy is the combination of cohesion and mutual trust. The

importance of common values and similar goals among residents dates back to the earliest social

disorganization research (Park & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942). When residents are mostly self‐

5

interested and care little about the community at large, it is inherently difficult for the neighborhood to

procure resources and to activate social ties to prevent crime. However, when there is cohesion and

mutual trust among residents, there is a greater likelihood that residents will acknowledge problems in

the community, will achieve consensus on how to address them, and will solve the problems in a more

collective fashion. In this sense, cohesion and mutual trust are precursors to problem solving.

Sampson and colleagues measure this component of collective efficacy by asking respondents in their

survey the extent to which they agree with the following statements: (1) people around here are willing

to help their neighbors; (2) this is a close‐knit neighborhood; (3) people in this neighborhood can be

trusted; (4) people in this neighborhood generally don’t get along with each other; and (5) people in this

neighborhood do not share the same values.

Not surprisingly, measures of social cohesion and shared expectations for control were highly correlated

across neighborhoods in Chicago. The two components were combined to create a summary measure of

collective efficacy.

Sampson and colleagues (1997) contribute to social disorganization theory in two fundamental ways; first,

they empirically demonstrate that collective efficacy has a significant negative effect on violent crime, in

line with what social disorganization theory would predict, and second, they show that associations of

concentrated disadvantage and residential instability with violent crime are largely mediated by collective

efficacy.

The second contribution is arguably the most significant as it implies that neighborhood characteristics

are relevant to crime insofar as they produce (or fail to produce) collective efficacy. In the years since

Sampson and colleagues (1997) introduced the concept, studies examining collective efficacy in Chicago

and beyond have proliferated. In general, findings from this literature echo what Sampson and colleagues

documented – communities with greater levels of collective efficacy have lower rates of crime and

violence, controlling for other factors, and that collective efficacy mediates the effects of ecological

characteristics on crime and violence (Browning 2009; Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz, 2004; Mazerolle,

Wickes, & Mc Broom, 2010; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).

Moreover, given an emphasis on purposive action, the prevailing assumption has become that the

explanatory power of collective efficacy is not limited to just certain types of crime or violence. For

example, Browning (2002) examines the impact of collective efficacy on partner violence. Using Sampson

et al.’s survey data, as well as other data sources, he demonstrates that collective efficacy has a crime‐

reducing impact on partner violence, independent of individual and relationship characteristics that

heighten domestic violence risk.

Another study by Dekeseredy, Alvi, & Tomaszewski (2003), which examines women’s victimization in

Ontario public housing, also documents support for collective efficacy’s impact. In essence, it is becoming

clearer that collective efficacy likely impacts a range of crimes and delinquent behaviors, as well as other

related outcomes such as social disorder (see, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).

In recent years, collective efficacy scholars have turned their attention to the role of peers and the extent

to which parental supervision of teenage peer groups may matter for crime. Maimon & Browning (2010)

once again utilize PHDCN survey data to identify whether collective efficacy modifies the effect that

unstructured peer socialization has on violent behavior. Their multilevel models, involving 842 Chicago

6

residents in 78 neighborhoods, confirm that collective efficacy has a negative (independent) influence on

violence. More importantly, they find that an “individual’s unstructured socializing with peers is less likely

to result in violence within high collective efficacy neighborhoods” (466). Their results provide evidence

that collective efficacy can attenuate the deleterious effects of other social pressures on crime. Of course

in assessing collective efficacy’s usefulness for social disorganization theory, and impact in the field more

generally, one should consider the concept’s predictive validity in relation to other correlates of crime –

a task that Pratt & Cullen (2005) undertake in their meta‐analysis of macro‐level crime predictors. Pratt

and Cullen identify over 200 studies from 1960 to 1999 that have examined the ecological correlates of

crime, and perform a meta‐analysis to determine which predictors have strong and stable effects on crime

rates. Their findings reveal that relative to the other predictors, collective efficacy ranks fourth (out of 23)

in weighted effect size. Sampson (2006) argues this finding supports the notion that collective efficacy is

a robust predictor of crime rates, and is fundamental to social disorganization theory. In his presidential

address at the 2012 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Robert J. Sampson suggested

that collective efficacy, in effect, helps neighborhoods mitigate several problems – most notably, crime

and violence. Findings from the small but growing literature indicate he might be right. Yet there remain

only a limited number of studies that have empirically assessed just how collective efficacy affects crime

and related outcomes (for a more detailed discussion on this point, see Pratt & Cullen, 2005). For this

reason, researchers must continue to explore how collective efficacy impacts crime at varying points of

time and in varying social contexts. This will entail applying sophisticated and innovative methodological

approaches. Currently, we know very little about, for example, the longitudinal or reciprocal relationship

between collective efficacy and crime.

Social capital

One source in which scholars have recognized immense potential for understanding variation in

community crime rates is the impact of local organizations. Social disorganization theory presumes that

local organizations conducive to pro‐social interaction such as churches, youth groups, charities, civic

associations, and political groups, can enhance neighborhood informal social control. This is because civic

and social organizations facilitate the sharing of common values and goals among residents, thereby

increasing the collective ability to disseminate information, mobilize resources, and utilize social networks

towards combating crime (Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Triplett, Gainey, & Sun, 2003; Wilson, 1987).

Recently, criminologists have adopted the concept of social capital, defined as “the investment in social

relations with expected returns” (Lin, 1999:30), in order to argue that civically engaged communities yield

crime‐control benefits. Scholars posit that the investment in communal social relations (i.e., civic

engagement) is reflected by residents’ participation in civic and social organizations. Prosocial interaction

that originates within organizational settings extends to other settings in the greater community,

ultimately providing the expected return: the emergence or enhancement of informal social control. In

this sense, social capital refers to the potential for effective social action, as it does not directly

encapsulate purposive action. In criminology, social capital’s operationalization most frequently reflects

Lin’s (1999) higher‐order conceptualization, specifically, with respect to the investment in communal

social relations. Previous studies have measured social capital using at least one of the following types of

indicators: (1) a simple count of the number of civic and social organizations in the neighborhood; (2)

residents’ participation in these types of organizations; and (3) the level of trust among residents. The

simple count reflects investment in terms of the availability and opportunity for residents to participate

in pro‐social organizational settings. Residents’ organizational participation signifies the actual investment

7

made in these organizations. Finally, residents’ trust levels reveal the emotional investment that underlies

interpersonal relationships. Studies typically combine these indicators into a summary measure of social

capital or alternatively use one of them as a single‐measure construct (Beyerlein & Hipp, 2005; Lee, 2008;

Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer, 2001). The seminal work

of Putnam (1995, 2000) is arguably considered the standard research on social capital to date. For Putnam,

social capital is conceived as a multidimensional concept reflected by two general forms: trust and social

participation. The concept primarily features indices of political participation, civic participation, religious

participation, workplace connections, informal social ties, philanthropy, altruism, and volunteering.

According to Putnam (1995), levels of social capital in the United States have declined significantly since

the 1960s. Putnam’s evidence in support of this claim includes declining participation rates in bowling

leagues, church attendance, The Boy Scouts, labor unions, and parent– teacher associations. Putnam

maintains this decline is problematic to the extent that “successful outcomes are more likely in civically

engaged communities” (Putnam 1995: 65).

In support of this contention, state‐level analyses of archival and survey data reveal both trust and social

participation to be negatively associated with crime (Putnam, 2000). Thus, consistent with social

disorganization theory, civically active communities have a greater ability to solve and prevent crime, all

else equal. Recent research has built on Putnam by incorporating diverse measures of social capital into

analyses. Beyerlein & Hipp (2005), for example, investigate the religious component of civic engagement

on crime in US counties. Acknowledging differences in social networks among religious traditions, their

models specify the number of congregations per 100,000 for several denominations of Christianity,

including mainline Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, and Catholicism. Beyerlein and Hipp find that

greater numbers of congregations per capita – regardless of the denomination – are associated with lower

crime rates across counties.

In another study, Lee (2008) develops a civic engagement index that not only includes the number of

religious congregations, but also the number of civic associations, sport leagues, and hobby and special

interest groups in his analysis of rural US counties. Lee (2008) finds that areas with higher levels of civic

engagement have lower crime rates.

And in a third study, Peterson, Krivo, & Harris (2000) examine whether the presence of recreation centers

and libraries impact crime rates in neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio. Peterson and colleagues discover

that while libraries have little impact on crime, the presence of recreation centers appears to mitigate

violent crime in the most disadvantaged Columbus neighborhoods.

Two key challenges for researchers have been assessing the reciprocal influence that crime has on social

capital and determining social capital’s spatial effects. One study by Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer (2001)

examines the reciprocal nature of the social capital–crime relationship. Rosenfeld and colleagues perform

a series of structural equation models (SEM), which reveal that their latent variable of social capital (which

includes a dimension for both organizational participation and trust) is negatively associated with

homicide rates across a sample of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. This protective effect is

unaffected by standard correlates of crime as well as the reciprocal influence that homicide has on social

capital.

Hipp, Petersilia, & Turner (2010) address the spatial effects of social capital in their investigation of how

the availability of social capital (oriented) organizations affects the likelihood of recidivism for California

8

parolees. Examining the number of such organizations within two miles of the parolee’s current address,

Hipp and colleagues find that a one standard deviation increase in the availability of social capital oriented

organizations decreases the likelihood of recidivating by more than 40%. Although the analysis estimates

an individual‐level outcome (recidivism of individual parolees), it is not unreasonable to suggest that this

protective effect applies at the community level as well.

As previously alluded, social capital can be theorized along several dimensions as well as using a variety

of methodological approaches. Yet, there is a pressing need to identify the general effect that social capital

has on crime rates across aggregate units of analysis. Pratt & Cullen (2005) begin to address this need by

providing a (quasi) quantitative synthesis of studies associated with social capital. They focus explicitly on

the impact of noneconomic institutions, which capture those studies that examine the level of religious

and political participation within communities – two indicators frequently applied in the

operationalization of social capital. They find that the strength of noneconomic institutions ranks first (out

of 23) in weighted effect size and, in line with predictions, such institutions are negatively associated with

crime. Although their measure is only a proxy for social capital, the strength of the effect size suggests

that social capital is potentially a robust predictor of lower crime rates, and therefore crucial to

understanding the establishment of social control. The studies building upon Putnam’s seminal work are

generally supportive of an inverse relationship between social capital and crime. However, we suggest it

would be premature to conclude that social capital is a robust predictor of lower crime rates, mainly

because current studies differ so drastically with respect to units of analysis, research settings, time‐

periods, and estimated outcomes. Moreover, there is a developing concern regarding the extent to which

social capital is theoretically distinct from collective efficacy and social networks (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).

Scholars have identified mutual trust as a dimension of both social capital and collective efficacy. Similarly,

mutual trust may condition the relationship between social networks and crime. In summary, although

social capital presents the opportunity to better understand the emergence of social control in

communities, more research must be done before it is fully incorporated into social disorganization

theory.

Social ties and neighborhood networks

From the earliest formulations of social disorganization theory, the concept of social ties has occupied a

central place in the theory. An enduring assumption is that socially disorganized neighborhoods lack the

social ties that activate mechanisms of informal social control (Kornhauser, 1978; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003;

Park & Burgess, 1925; Sampson, 2006; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942). So when crime

problems emerge, the theory reasons, residents are unable to effectively respond via the dissemination

of information, the implementation of guardianship behavior, the mobilization of resources, and the

coordination of civic events. According to the theory, the formation and maintenance of informal social

control thus requires the neighborhood to have an abundant supply of strong ties that connect residents

to one another. Accordingly, criminologists have long examined how the presence of social ties as well as

their utility and content are related to neighborhood crime rates.

Despite substantial work in this area, the measurement of social ties is generally limited to two types of

indicators: (1) the quantity of social ties, and (2) the content of those ties. Such information is typically

ascertained via survey questions which instruct respondents to provide information about their social

exchanges and interactions with fellow neighbors. The first indicator reflects an assumption that there is

9

a high correspondence between an abundance of social ties and the activation of informal social control

mechanisms.

In contrast, the second indicator suggests that the type of social ties among residents (e.g., family, friends,

acquaintances, or strangers) will differentially impact the ability to prevent crime. According to the theory,

those social ties that represent emotional investment and reflect frequent interaction are deemed to be

“strong,” while those ties that exhibit less familiarity and interaction are considered to be “weak.”

Accordingly, the strength of neighborhood ties is considered fundamental to the informal control of crime.

Despite the theory’s predictions, the collective body of research suggests that the evidence in support of

social ties’ impact is mixed with respect to crime reduction. Some studies identify social ties as a catalyst

for effective social action to fight crime (e.g., Sampson & Groves, 1989) while others demonstrate that

social ties may actually facilitate crime (e.g., Pattillo, 1998). In regards to the former, the seminal article

by Sampson and Groves, discussed earlier, lends considerable support to the notion that an

interconnected network of strong ties characterizes lower‐crime neighborhoods. Recall they used data

from a large national survey of Great Britain. The survey included a question instructing respondents to

indicate how many of their friends reside in their local community, from which Sampson and Groves

constructed a community measure of local friendship networks defined as “the mean level of local

friendships” (784). Their network measure captures the abundance of social ties characterized by frequent

interaction and emotional investment. Also recall that Sampson and Groves show that the mediating

dimension of local friendship networks has an independent effect on crime and delinquency outcomes,

net of (exogenous) neighborhood characteristics. This finding suggests that neighborhood networks do

appear to activate and maintain mechanisms of informal social control. The promise of social ties for social

disorganization theory is less apparent in Bellair’s (1997) study, which explicitly assesses how the

frequency of interaction among neighborhood residents influences crime. Using survey data from

residents of 60 urban neighborhoods (spanning three states), Bellair finds that social interaction, here

defined as the percentage of community residents who get together once a year or more, reduces

community rates of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. He also finds that social interaction largely

mediates the effect of neighborhood characteristics on community crime, in support of social

disorganization theory. Yet Bellair’s findings ultimately raise questions regarding the value of social ties

for the theory. Although social interaction is significantly associated with community crime rates in the

direction the theory predicts, the fact that even infrequent interaction can reduce community crime rates

challenges the theory’s assumption that strong and dense ties are what matter most; Bellair’s “once a

year or more” definition reflects a level of interaction that is arguably less than what the perspective

theorizes.

Other studies produce conflicting evidence regarding the impact of social ties. For example, using survey

data from the city of Seattle, Warner & Rountree (1997) document mixed support for social ties’ crime

reducing impact. Their measure of social ties, or what they refer to as “local ties,” reflects the extent to

which respondents had done each of the following: (1) borrowed tools or food from neighbors; (2) had

lunch or dinner with neighbors; and (3) had helped neighbors with problems. While Warner and Rountree

find that local ties are associated with lower rates of assault in Seattle neighborhoods, they contrastingly

find that these ties are associated with higher rates of burglary. As a result, Warner and Rountree question

the assumption that social ties automatically translate into greater levels of informal social control, as the

theory predicts.

10

Even more troubling are findings from studies which suggest that social ties may, in fact, serve as a source

of social capital for offenders, thereby increasing the likelihood of offending. Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz

(2004) arrive at this conclusion in their study of the impact of collective efficacy and social ties on violent

crime rates in Chicago neighborhoods. Using Sampson’s PHDCN survey data, they discover that while

collective efficacy is associated with diminished rates of violence, social ties and exchange between

residents appears to diminish neighborhood social control. Browning and colleagues also conclude that

the “regulatory effects of collective efficacy on violence are substantially reduced in neighborhoods

characterized by high levels of network interaction and reciprocated exchange” (503).

Questionable findings regarding social ties’ impact are not limited to quantitative analyses. A study by

Pattillo (1998) qualitatively documents the complex relationships among social ties, informal social

control, and crime. Through participant observation and face‐to‐face interviews in a middle‐class black

neighborhood in Chicago, she finds that residents are highly connected to one another and that these

strong ties are characterized by emotional investment and frequent interaction. As a result, and in support

of social disorganization theory, the neighborhood is able to keep crime to a relatively acceptable level

through the supervision of youth, the identification of strangers, and the mobilization of community

organizations. However, the value of these ties comes with a trade‐off; Pattillo also finds that the social

ties frequently connect law abiding residents and criminals, thereby making it more challenging for the

neighborhood to eradicate criminal activity. This occurs because residents are reluctant to publicly shame

or legally sanction those with whom they are closely tied (even in the face of illegal behavior). Once again

these findings, which reveal that social ties can simultaneously enhance and undermine informal social

control, question the relevance of this concept for social disorganization theory. Although the evidence in

support of social ties is mixed, we do not mean to suggest that criminology should abandon studying the

impact of neighborhood networks on crime. Instead, the present challenge is to pinpoint the specific

characteristics of networks that precipitate and mitigate crime. Doing this will require scholars to

recognize, as Sampson (2006: 164) points out, that “not all networks are created equal.” In the context of

social disorganization theory, this means acknowledging that while neighborhood networks may be

capable of facilitating effective social action, they are likely not sufficient, in and of themselves, to fulfill

social control functions.

Sampson (2006) lists three reasons why neighborhood networks should not be equated with effective

social control: (1) weak ties can be equally important in the activation of informal social control (see also

Granovetter, 1973); (2) strong ties can undermine social control efforts; and, (3) social ties may connect

law‐abiding citizens with criminals and vice versa. In extending and refining the concepts of social ties and

neighborhood networks for social disorganization theory, researchers must account for these “social

facts.”

Conclusion

Social disorganization theory has long occupied an important place in criminological thought and

continues to do so well into the 21st century. But as with all theories, in order to survive it must be

continuously subjected to testing and then reevaluated in light of the empirical evidence. Despite the

theory’s predictive power, in this chapter, we have suggested there is room for improvement, particularly

when it comes to specifying the social interactional mechanisms that link structural characteristics of

communities, such as poverty and residential instability, to heightened crime rates in socially disorganized

communities. We have also suggested that such improvement may occur by attending to more recent

11

theoretical concepts that borrow from, but go beyond, social ties and informal social control. These

include collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks. In this chapter, we have defined these

concepts, explicated their usefulness for social disorganization theory, and reviewed the empirical

literature on their effectiveness. We believe these concepts hold significant promise. We conclude with

one final suggestion regarding the fundamental challenge involved in linking structural characteristics to

crime in socially disorganized communities.

This final suggestion is related to the role that neighborhood culture/ subculture likely occupies for social

disorganization theory. Although often downplayed (and even ignored) by scholars today, neighborhood

subculture was of key interest to Shaw and McKay and other early social disorganization theorists.

A central question for these scholars centered on how neighborhood subcultures became entrenched and

affected rates of delinquency. They posed the question: Under what economic and social conditions does

crime develop as a social tradition and become embodied in a system of criminal values? Shaw and McKay

found evidence regarding the impact of neighborhood subculture on crime and delinquency. Of particular

interest is their finding that areas of low economic status were characterized by diversity in norms and

standards of behavior, rather than uniformity (recall that solidarity, or an internal consensus on norms

and values, is critical for social organization). Shaw and McKay found that in poor communities, youth

were exposed to a wide variety of contradictory (and sometimes unlawful) standards rather than to a

relatively consistent and conventional pattern of norms. It was also determined that in these

communities, children were exposed to adult criminals, from whom they could learn (illegal) behavior.

In essence then, alongside social ties and informal social control, neighborhood subculture constituted a

critical component of social disorganization theory, and helped to account for why crime rates were higher

in disorganized neighborhoods. Decades following Shaw and McKay, researchers continued to examine

how neighborhood subculture impacted crime and delinquency, as well as how it was itself impacted by

neighborhood conditions (e.g., Miller, 1958; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Kornhauser, 1978).

Unfortunately, for reasons that have been explicated elsewhere (see Sampson & Bean, 2006),

neighborhood subculture increasingly became irrelevant to the theory. Discussions regarding

neighborhood subculture’s impact became obsolete and empirical examinations of the theory did not

include measures reflecting local subculture.

Most recently, however, cultural explanations have been resurrected in neighborhood research, which

we argue is a positive development. Scholars are both theorizing culture’s potential impact on community

crime rates (Anderson, 1999; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson & Bean, 2006)

as well as empirically examining just how culture and crime are associated in both organized and

disorganized communities (Berg et al., 2012; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998;

Stewart & Simons, 2006; Warner, 2003). Research on cultural effects is relatively new, so there is much

to be worked out with respect to the precise role that subculture occupies in social disorganization theory.

But scholars are beginning to sort out the issues and progress in occurring. Although we are unable to

review the important findings from this nascent but growing literature, what we can say here is that it is

becoming abundantly clear that, in the words of Kubrin & Weitzer (2003: 380), “cultural factors deserve

greater attention” and can no longer be ignored. As Shaw and McKay and other early theorists believed,

we cannot understand variations in crime rates across communities without also understanding the role

that neighborhood subcultures occupy in the calculus. Along with greater attention to the concepts of

12

collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks, future work must continue to specify subculture’s

critical role.

References

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Bellair, P.E. (1997). Social interaction and community crime: Examining the importance of neighbor

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Berg, M.T., Stewart, E.A., Brunson, R.K., & Simons, R.L. (2012). Neighborhood cultural h eterogeneity and

adolescent violence. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28, 411–435.

Beyerlein, K., & Hipp, J.R. (2005). Social capital, too much of a good thing? American religious traditions

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Browning, C.R. (2002). The span of collective efficacy: Extending social disorganization theory to partner

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Browning, C.R., Feinberg, S.L., & Dietz, R.D. (2004). The paradox of social organization: Networks,

collective efficacy, and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. Social Forces, 83, 503–534.

Bursik, R.J. (1988). Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency – problems and prospects.

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Dekeseredy, W.S., Alvi, S., & Tomaszewski, A.E. (2003). Perceived collective efficacy and women’s

victimization in public housing. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 3, 5–27.

Elliott, D.S., Wilson, W.J., Huizinga, D., Sampson, R.J., Elliott, A., & Rankin, B. (1996). The effects of

neighborhood disadvantage on adolescent development. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,

33, 389–426.

Fagan, J., & Wilkinson, D. (1998). Guns, youth violence, and social identity in inner cities. In M. Tonry & M.

Moore (Eds.), Crime and Justice, 24 (pp.105–188). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Granovetter, M.S.

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Hipp, J.R., Petersilia, J., & Turner, S. (2010). Parolee recidivism in California: The effect of n eighborhood

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Kornhauser, R. (1978). Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Kubrin, C.E., & Weitzer, R. (2003). New directions in social disorganization theory. Journal of Research in

Crime and Delinquency, 40, 374–402.

Kubrin, C.E., Stucky, T.D., & Krohn, M.D. (2009). Researching Theories of Crime and Deviance. New York:

Oxford University Press. Lee, M.R. (2008). Civic community in the hinterland: Toward a theory of rural

social structure and violence. Criminology, 46, 447–478.

Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social capital. Connections, 1, 28–51.

Maimon, D., & Browning, C.R. (2010). Unstructured socializing, collective efficacy, and violent behavior

among urban youth. Criminology, 48, 443–474.

Mazerolle, L., Wickes, R., & McBroom, J. (2010). Community variations in violence: The role of social ties

and collective efficacy in comparative context. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 47, 3–30.

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in the Urban Environment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Peterson, R.D., Krivo, L.J., & Harris, M.A. (2000). Disadvantage and neighborhood violent crime: Do local

institutions matter? Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 31–63.

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Sampson, R.J., & Bean, L. (2006). Cultural mechanisms and killing fields: A revised theory of community‐

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Inequalities of Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America (pp. 8–36). New York: New York University Press.

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Sampson, R.J., & Groves, W.B. (1989). Community structure and crime: Testing social disorganization

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partial test of the code of the street thesis. Justice Quarterly, 23, 1–33.

Triplett, R.A., Gainey, R.R., & Sun, I.Y. (2003). Institutional strength, social control, and neighborhood

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Harvard University Press.

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Assess the extent to which crime figures and trends are influenced by social class, and in particular by common assumptions made about the ‘underclass

You should complete any one of the questions below. 

1. Assess the extent to which crime figures and trends are influenced by social class, and in particular by common assumptions made about the ‘underclass’.

2. Labelling and subcultural theories see crime and deviance as the outcome of social processes. What are these processes and how convincing are the theoretical accounts of them? 

3. Some social groups appear to experience secondary victimisation in which police actions amplify rather than decrease the experience of victimisation. Who is most likely to experience this? Why? What can be done to prevent it?

(3,000 words criminology assignment help)

As part of the formal assessment for the programme you are required to submit a Crime and Society assessment. Please refer to your Student Handbook for full details of the programme assessment scheme and general information on preparing and submitting assignments. Learning Outcomes: After completing the module, you should be able to:

1. Demonstrate a basic understanding of patterns of crime and the significance of crime in society.

2. Demonstrate a basic understanding of the respective institutional roles in the criminal justice system and their relationships with each other, and with society. 

3. Demonstrate a basic understanding of criminological theories and their relationships to each other. 

4. Demonstrate a basic ability to analyse social, philosophical and legal issues relating to crime, criminal justice and social policies. 

5. Demonstrate an understanding of the ethical issues embedded in analyses of problems, existing policies and options for policy change.

The critical assessment involves a few steps. First, translating a written argument into a form that can be analyzed using tools you have learned in class. The next step is to use these tools to critically explore the argument being made. The analysis involves doing more than merely paraphrasing the textbook, class notes, or using jargon. It involves things like identifying which model/tool is appropriate for this context, checking to see if the assumptions required are satisfied, identifying any changes in circumstances, and working through the predictions, etc. You need to be able to compare your analysis with the author’s arguments and be able to articulate any differences or similarities in a precise manner. The final step in this leadership assignment help is translating all of this back into clear language that readers can easily understand. Task There will be two writing assignments in this course to give you practice and opportunities to get feedback on your writing. This is an individual writing assignment. For this writing assignment, you will be given an economic podcast and will be asked to critically evaluate it. You will be graded on the quality and thoroughness of your analysis. Therefore, you will also be graded on the clarity, flow and overall cohesiveness of the writing in your work Podcast: How Spotify Saved the Music Industry Work Outline Introduction (5 points): The introduction (first paragraph) briefly summarizes what you consider to be the main point(s) of the article. If there are many, focus on the one(s) that you will analyze in the assignment. Summary (5 points) : A short summary of the podcast should be included. This summary should capture the key points presented in the podcast and any important facts or elements. Do not spend the whole assignment summarizing the entire article. Summaries should be succinct and to the point and be approximately one paragraph. 

Analysis (15 points): https://epicessayhelp.com/tag/criminology-assignment-help/ 

In your own words, you need to explain how Spotify saved the music industry. This is not a summary of the podcast. That was the previous paragraph. Remember, you are looking at this writing assignment through the lens of an economist. You will need to research the short-run and long-run effects that Spotify had on the music industry, going beyond what has been explained in the podcast. Do not copy and past graphs or charts from outside sources. Are there others like Spotify that have changed their own respective industries? What are they? How was the industry affected? Was it good or bad? Your analysis should use the economic concepts you have learned in class. In other words, the analysis should focus on how topics covered in class are applicable/relevant to the real world. Be sure to demonstrate your analysis using graphs and/or models learned in class. Be careful to address the appropriate audience. Remember; to narrow your focus so that your analysis can be more in-depth. That is much more important than hitting every point made in the article. You are required to do in-depth research into this issue going beyond the podcast and text. Assume your reader has taken this course and only understands microeconomic theories in the context of the theories covered in this class. You are expected to use at least one of the concepts covered in class. Policy Recommendation (20 points): This is the most important aspect of this assignment. Students are expected to clearly and in detail provide a policy recommendation. In this section, you need to think of an industry that needs improvement. How would you go about making a change such that it brings about a revolutionary change? Think of the impacts companies like Facebook, Uber, Spotify has had on their respective industries. Again, I expect you to use multiple models in this section. The analysis portion has the potential to be varied in nature. However, I recommend sticking to my guidelines below: Provide a summary of your policy recommendation and explain how it works. Then, critically evaluate your policy recommendation. 

https://profsonly.com/assignment-2-grading-rubric-15-points-explained-infection-control-in-terms-that-a-typical/

Essentially you should take apart the various steps in the recommendation and see if they make sense separately and as a whole. Can you use the tools learned in class to think about the policy in another way? Check to see if you are missing anything in your argument or have used some tool or method incorrectly or inappropriately. That is, think on the other side of the aisle and find counter-arguments. Is there evidence that contradicts your policy? If so, how would you address them? I expect you to use at least 1 economic model we have learned in class. However, using one model does not guarantee full credit. Your models should also be detailed. Make sure you explain what the models mean and clearly demonstrate the economic implications. All models must be drawn by hand. Any models “grabbed” from the text or internet will not count and will adversely affect your grade. Your hand-drawn models should be scanned and of high quality. Conclusion (5 points): It is important to have a strong conclusion since this is the last chance you have to make an impression on your reader. The goal of your conclusion isn’t to introduce any new ideas, but to sum up, everything you’ve written. Specifically, your conclusion should accomplish three major goals: Restate the main idea of your work, or your thesis statement. Summarize the main sub-points of your work. Leave the reader with an interesting final impression. Works Cited: Works cited completed using MLA format. Must cite at least 3 sources. Class notes/lectures can account for one source. The textbook can account for one source. How to format your assignment Your assignment should be typed, double-spaced, 1-inch margins, and have a font size 12. Minimum of 3 pages (not including models, works cited page). Your models must be hand-drawn, scanned as an image, and pasted to your word document. Grammatical mistakes Students are required to proofread their assignments prior to submitting them. Students are recommended to utilize the campus-writing center to ensure any grammatical/writing errors are corrected. I generally do not give lower grades for grammatical mistakes. However, if the writing is too incomprehensible/unclear, there will be a reflection in the overall grade. You are encouraged to take advantage of Glendale Community College’s Writing Center. https://www.glendale.edu/students/student-services/learning-center-tutoring/writing-center (Links to an external site.) 

Ref: https://profsonly.com/assignment-help/accounting-assignment-help-from-expert-writers/ 

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Podcast: How Spotify Saved the Music Industry (Links to an external site.) Work Outline Introduction (5 points): The introduction (first paragraph) briefly summarizes what you consider to be the main point(s) of the article. If there are many, focus on the one(s) that you will analyze in the assignment. Summary (5 points) : A short summary of the podcast should be included. This summary should capture the key points presented in the podcast and any important facts or elements. Do not spend the whole assignment summarizing the entire article. Summaries should be succinct and to the point and be approximately one paragraph. Analysis (15 points): In your own words, you need to explain how Spotify saved the music industry. This is not a summary of the podcast. That was the previous paragraph. Remember, you are looking at this writing assignment through the lens of an economist. You will need to research the short-run and long-run effects that Spotify had on the music industry, going beyond what has been explained in the podcast. Do not copy and past graphs or charts from outside sources. Are there others like Spotify that have changed their own respective industries? What are they? How was the industry affected? Was it good or bad? Your analysis should use the economic concepts you have learned in class. In other words, the analysis should focus on how topics covered in class are applicable/relevant to the real world. Be sure to demonstrate your analysis using graphs and/or models learned in class. Be careful to address the appropriate audience. Remember; to narrow your focus so that your analysis can be more in-depth. That is much more important than hitting every point made in the article. You are required to do in-depth research into this issue going beyond the podcast and text. Assume your reader has taken this course and only understands microeconomic theories in the context of the theories covered in this class. You are expected to use at least one of the concepts covered in class. Policy Recommendation (20 points): This is the most important aspect of this assignment. Students are expected to clearly and in detail provide a policy recommendation. In this section, you need to think of an industry that needs improvement. How would you go about making a change such that it brings about a revolutionary change? Think of the impacts companies like Facebook, Uber, Spotify has had on their respective industries. Again, I expect you to use multiple models in this section. The analysis portion has the potential to be varied in nature. However, I recommend sticking to my guidelines below: Provide a summary of your policy recommendation and explain how it works. Then, critically evaluate your policy recommendation. Essentially you should take apart the various steps in the recommendation and see if they make sense separately and as a whole. Can you use the tools learned in class to think about the policy in another way? Check to see if you are missing anything in your argument or have used some tool or method incorrectly or inappropriately. That is, think on the other side of the aisle and find counter-arguments. Is there evidence that contradicts your policy? If so, how would you address them? I expect you to use at least 1 economic model we have learned in class. However, using one model does not guarantee full credit. Your models should also be detailed. Make sure you explain what the models mean and clearly demonstrate the economic implications. All models must be drawn by hand. Any models “grabbed” from the text or internet will not count and will adversely affect your grade. Your hand-drawn models should be scanned and of high quality. Conclusion (5 points): It is important to have a strong conclusion since this is the last chance you have to make an impression on your reader. The goal of your conclusion isn’t to introduce any new ideas, but to sum up, everything you’ve written. Specifically, your conclusion should accomplish three major goals: profsonly.com/assignment-help

This week we will start the process of compiling your edited and polished work for the assessment portion of your portfolio, demonstrating your mastery of a selected learning outcome from your program. Instructions Select one learning outcome from your program of study. Then, select two graded artifacts (i.e., written assignments, projects, works, discussion posts, or responses) that you feel best demonstrate your mastery of the selected program outcome. When selecting a previous work sample, you can review and retrieve your Waypoint assignments from previous courses from within Waypoint itself. Utilizing the feedback you received on these artifacts from your instructor as well as the things you have learned since submitting this work, revise and expand on these artifacts to create polished and corrected examples that you can add to your portfolio. Utilize track changes to make additions, corrections, and changes to your work in order for the instructor to review the changes that were made. Add two additional professional and current resources to support and improve your artifacts. Submit Combine the two updated artifacts (include track changes) into one document and submit via Waypoint. Then remove the tracked changes from the artifacts and add the polished and corrected artifacts to your portfolio with the correct heading and description of the selected program learning outcome. Insert a link to your portfolio in a Word document and submit via Waypoint. If needed, review the Week 1 python assignment help.

Create and add to your portfolio some of the important career-portfolio elements as described below. Personal Introduction: Who are you? Describe in one paragraph your strengths, interests, and experiences that make you a unique and valuable employee. This might look much like the introduction used on LinkedIn. This would be an appropriate place to use pictures to create a more interesting portfolio in this history assignment help. Professional Curriculum Vitae (CV) or Resume: Be sure that you have updated your resume or CV to reflect your status as a doctoral student. Note: It is never appropriate to add the degree to your name until AFTER you have graduated. While you may see people list PhD, ABD, this is not appropriate and should not be used. You may, however, add your expected date of completion or year of graduation. Highlight specific field-related experience, philosophy, or other information. If you are in education or are interested in teaching in the future, you might list your teaching philosophy here. For psychology, you may list your areas of specialization. You may also choose to highlight any specialized training or certification you possess. Carefully consider the design elements of your portfolio, including the use of a professional font, pictures, reference materials, and access for future employees and others. Submit Insert a link to your portfolio in a Word document and submit via Waypoint

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commit the crime and forensic examinations of  evidence related to firearms

Select a real homicide case in which a firearm was used to commit the crime and forensic examinations of  evidence related to firearms (cartridge casings, bullets, GSR, etc.) were utilized to assist in determining “what” happened.

First, summarize the case, then explain in detail the role forensic firearm examinations had in the case. What did the examinations and evidence reveal? Consider the use of GSR, ballistics, and NIBIN in the case. You can also discuss other forensic evidence, but the focus should be on firearm evidence. 

2-3 pages, in APA format, and include at least two scholarly references

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SACR-3670. White Collar Crime

This course focuses on criminal and non-criminal harms perpetrated by powerful individuals, organizations, and institutions. Topics covered may include political corruption, genocide, environmental crime, workplace injury and death, food contamination, stock market manipulation and various other kinds of fraud. The development and enforcement of criminal, administrative, and civil law will be examined along with different theoretical perspectives on this specific type of criminal behaviour. (Prerequisites: SACR-2600, SACR-2620 and semester 5 or higher standing)

Society today is complicated. You’ll learn how to unravel its most urgent issues in this program that is focused on research, analysis and communication — skills relevant to a wide range of fields. You can tailor your degree by picking courses that match your interests. The department is small, ensuring you’ll get lots of personal attention.

  • Sample Courses: Foundations of Social Life; Social Dilemmas; Sociology of Families; Perspectives on Culture; Crimes of the State: Genocide, War Crimes and Ethnic Cleansing; Social Movements
  • Career Tracks: Immigration officer, human resources manager, community relations worker, mediator, case worker

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Provide three crime reduction strategies or policies that are based on the theory that you selected.

  • Provide an overview of the criminological theory you selected. Include the main tenets and propositions in your overview.
  • Describe how this theory explains the occurrence of crime.
  • Include biological, psychological, social, and structural variables.
  • Provide three crime reduction strategies or policies that are based on the theory that you selected. These may be existing strategies or policies, or ones that you create.
  • Analyze how each crime reduction strategy or policy is based on the theory that you selected. Identify which theoretical tenet each crime reduction strategy or policy is based on.
  • Summarize your presentation by explaining which types of crimes each of your strategies or policies will most likely impact and how they might contribute to social change.
  •  three scholarly resources that focus on a criminological theory. Select one criminological theory to use in your presentation
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Deviance as Crime Presentation

Assignment One: Deviance as Crime Presentation

Assignment Overview

Not all deviance is crime, and not all crimes are considered deviant. For example, jaywalking is technically against the law in many places, however it is so commonplace that it is likely to be considered the norm rather than a deviant act. By contrast, many forms of deviance are not against the law, no matter how unusual they may seem; for example, in some locations nudity is not illegal, nor is the use of recreational marijuana, nor intimate arrangements such as polyamory. For this assignment, you must choose a type of deviance that is also a crime — that is, it is illegal — and apply our course concepts to the illegal deviance.

Assignment Instructions

For this assignment, you will put together a presentation of 10 slides minimum. You may use a presentation program of your choice such as any of these which offer free use:

PowerPoint.

Your Presentation must explore the following:

1) Select a type of deviance that is ALSO a crime – that is, it is illegal. Describe this behavior and how it impacts society, giving solid statistical data to explain the scope of the problem. How is this type of deviance typically depicted in the media (providing examples, if applicable)? What seems to be the perception of this behavior in society? Does it seem that there is a change in perception in society in terms of activities that were once illegal (such as the legalization of marijuana in many states)?

2) Integrating information from the course readings and materials, how would a positivist explain the deviant behavior you selected?

3) Integrating information from the course readings and materials, how would a social constructionist explain the deviant behavior you selected?

4) Define TWO sociological concepts/theories from our course materials — OTHER than positivism or social constructionism — that relate to your example of deviance and analyze how these concepts/theories help to better understand the deviance you are discussing.

Note – Concepts may include ideas such as class, gender, race, ethnicity, stratification, disability, and many others — these are just examples. You need to choose concepts that make sense in your analysis. Sociological theories may include conflict theory, feminist theory, symbolic interactionism, functionalism and others. These are just examples; you need to choose theories that make sense in your analysis.

Do not use unverifiable, secondary sites such as Wikipedia, about.com, ask.com, and similar. Use our course materials, peer-reviewed journal articles from the library, and other scholarly sources.

Your presentation should utilize sound critical thought and full APA references at the end.

The structure of the Presentation must include the following:

— TITLE SLIDE/SECTION (1 slide)

— BODY OF PRESENTATION WITH SUBHEADINGS (8 slides minimum)

— REFERENCE SLIDE/SECTION (1-2 slides)

General requirements:

Use APA format for citations and references

View the grading rubric so you understand how you will be assessed on this Assignment.

Disclaimer- Originality of attachments will be verified by Turnitin. Both you and your instructor will receive the results.

This course has “Resubmission” status enabled to help you if you realized you submitted an incorrect or blank file, or if you need to submit multiple documents as part of your Assignment. Resubmission of an Assignment after it is graded, to attempt a better grade, is not permitted


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