Socially Disorganized Communities
1
Social Disorganization Theory’s Greatest Challenge: Linking Structural Characteristics to Crime in
Socially Disorganized Communities
Charis E. Kubrin and James C. Wo
The Handbook of Criminological Theory, First Edition. Edited by Alex R. Piquero. © 2016 John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [pp. 121 – 136]
Why do some neighborhoods have higher crime rates than others? What is it about certain communities
that consistently generate high crime rates? These are the central questions of interest for social
disorganization theory, a macro‐level perspective concerned with explaining the spatial distribution of
crime across areas. Social disorganization theory has emerged as the critical framework for understanding
the relationship between community characteristics and crime in urban areas. According to the theory,
certain neighborhood characteristics – most notably poverty, residential instability, and racial
heterogeneity – can lead to social disorganization. Social disorganization, in turn, can cause crime. In this
chapter, we first describe social disorganization theory, laying out the theory’s key principles and
propositions. We then discuss one of the most serious and enduring challenges confronting the theory –
identifying and empirically verifying the social interactional mechanisms that link structural characteristics
of communities, such as poverty and residential instability, to heightened crime rates in socially
disorganized communities. And finally, we present some promising new directions for the theory by
discussing several theoretical concepts that may be useful for scholars interested in identifying and
measuring the theory’s interactional mechanisms; these include social capital, collective efficacy, and
social networks. We conclude the chapter with some remarks about one additional important theoretical
direction for social disorganization theory: incorporating the role of neighborhood subculture in
explanations of crime and delinquency.
The origins of social disorganization theory date back to the early 1900s. In 1929, two researchers from
the University of Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, began a series of studies using official records
which showed that in the city of Chicago, rates of delinquency, criminality, and commitment to
correctional institutions varied markedly by area. In particular, rates were highest in slums near the city
center and diminished as distance from the center of the city increased, except in areas of industry and
commerce just outside of the central district, which had some of the highest rates.
Shaw and McKay also found that rates of crime and delinquency exhibited a remarkable consistent
patterning over many decades; in particular, the spatial pattern of rates revealed significant long‐term
stability even though the nationality structure of the population in the inner‐city areas changed greatly
over time. Shaw and McKay thus determined that crime and delinquency were not the result of personal
characteristics of the residents who lived in the neighborhoods but were tied to the neighborhoods
themselves. Since areas of high and low crime and delinquency maintained their relative positions over
many years, a key theoretical task became to explain the existence and stability of these area differentials
over time.
A fundamental part of their explanation involved the concept of social disorganization. Social
disorganization refers to the inability of a community to realize the common values of its members and
maintain effective social controls. As Kornhauser describes, “Social disorganization exists in the first
instance when the structure and culture of a community are incapable of implementing and expressing
the values of its own residents.” (Kornhauser, 1978:63) According to the theory, a common value among
2
neighborhood residents is the desire for a crime‐free community. In essence, then, socially disorganized
neighborhoods are ineffective in combating crime. A socially organized community is characterized by (1)
solidarity, or an internal consensus on essential norms and values (e.g., residents want and value the same
things, such as a crime‐free neighborhood); (2) cohesion, or a strong bond among neighbors (e.g.,
residents know and like one another); and (3) integration, with social interaction occurring on a regular
basis (e.g., residents spend time with one another).
Conversely, a disorganized community has little solidarity among residents and lacks social cohesion or
integration. Perhaps the greatest difference between socially organized and disorganized neighborhoods
is the levels of informal social control in those neighborhoods. Informal social control is defined as the
scope of collective intervention that the community directs toward local problems, including crime
(Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1969). It is the informal, nonofficial actions taken by residents to
combat crime in their communities, such as, for example, when residents question persons about
suspicious activity or admonish misbehaving youth and inform parents of their children’s misconduct. In
essence, residents act as the “eyes and ears” of the community and their informal surveillance, and even
simple presence, deters others from engaging in crime.
According to the theory, socially disorganized neighborhoods have lower levels of informal social control,
and thus experience higher crime rates when compared to more socially organized neighborhoods.
Ecological characteristics of neighborhoods influence the degree of social disorganization in the
community. This is because certain characteristics can impede the development of social ties that
promote the ability to solve common problems, including crime. Ecological characteristics of greatest
interest to social disorganization researchers include poverty, joblessness, population mobility or
turnover, racial composition, and family disruption, among others. Although community characteristics
such as poverty or residential instability are related to crime, these factors themselves do not directly
cause crime, according to the theory. That is, ecological characteristics are related to crime only indirectly
through various neighborhood processes such as informal social control. As such, poverty, residential
instability, and other ecological characteristics are important in as much as they affect the mediating
processes of social disorganization. In light of the above discussion, the basic social disorganization causal
model can be expressed as: neighborhood characteristics → social ties → informal social control → crime.
Sampson describes the processes by which neighborhood characteristics and crime are associated:
Neighborhood characteristics such as family disorganization, residential mobility, and structural density
weaken informal social control networks; informal social controls are impeded by weak local social bonds,
lowered community attachment, anonymity, and reduced capacity for surveillance and guardianship;
other factors such as poverty and racial composition also probably affect informal control, although their
influence is in all likelihood indirect; residents in areas characterized by family disorganization, mobility,
and building density are less able to perform guardianship activities, less likely to report general deviance
to authorities, to intervene in public disturbances, and to assume responsibility for supervision of youth
activities; the result is that deviance is tolerated and public norms of social control are not effective
(Sampson, 1987: 109).
Social Disorganization Theory’s Greatest Challenge
Like all other theories discussed in this volume, there are ongoing challenges facing social disorganization
theory, some of which have been resolved more fully than others. These challenges have been discussed
3
at length in two important assessments of the theory at different points in time: Bursik (1988) and Kubrin
& Weitzer (2003). Although these scholars identify several challenges, perhaps the greatest involves
identifying and measuring the social mechanisms that account for heightened crime rates in socially
disorganized neighborhoods. Stated alternatively, a major conceptual limitation of social disorganization
research is the relative lack of attention paid to the processes that mediate the effect of community
characteristics (see also Byrne & Sampson, 1986).
Given the primitive nature of data analysis during the early 1900s, it is not surprising that scholars were
unable to conduct sophisticated analyses that would allow them to fully test social disorganization
theory’s arguments. Early Chicago school theorists “tested” the theory by plotting the spatial distribution
of crime in the city to determine whether it was consistent with the theory’s predictions, and then
correlated characteristics of neighborhoods with crime rates. Studies were able to document, for
example, that poor, mobile, and racially heterogeneous neighborhoods had the highest crime rates but
they could not specify the mechanisms (e.g., social ties, informal social control) accounting for this
relationship. This was problematic, in part, because it did not allow researchers to rule out competing
theoretical explanations such as strain, which also theorize a poverty–crime association.
Even decades after the early work of Chicago School researchers, little progress had been made in this
area. Studies included the “front end” of social disorganization models, that is, attributes of the
community, as well as the “back end” or crime and delinquency outcomes, but continued to leave out the
crucial middle, or indicators reflecting how much social disorganization is occurring in a neighborhood
(Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009: 91).
Significant progress was finally achieved with the publication of Robert Sampson and Byron Groves’ 1989
study, which used data from a large national survey of Great Britain to formally test social disorganization
theory. Sampson & Groves (1989) constructed community‐level measures of neighborhoods (e.g., low
socio‐economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, family disruption, and urbanization) as
well as the mediating dimensions of social disorganization (e.g., sparse local friendship networks,
unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation) and determined how both sets
of measures impacted neighborhood crime rates. The findings were largely supportive of social
disorganization theory: communities characterized by strong social ties and informal control had lower
rates of crime and delinquency.
Moreover, these dimensions of social disorganization were found to explain, in large part, the effects of
community structural characteristics on crime rates. This latter finding was important because it verified
for the first time that the structural conditions themselves do not influence crime; rather, they are
important only inasmuch as they produce social disorganization. Despite this progress, only a handful of
studies (e.g., Elliott et al., 1996; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Warner & Rountree, 1997) have fully
documented the theoretical processes laid out by social disorganization theory. Perhaps more
importantly, the findings we do have from this small but critical literature suggest these processes may
not be so straightforward. An increasing finding emerging from the literature is that social ties may not
play the expected role (see Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003: 375–379). As such, researchers are only beginning to
fully identify, understand, and empirically verify the social interactional mechanisms that link structural
characteristics to crime in neighborhoods. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, in part, in the
remainder of the chapter we discuss some promising theoretical developments for social disorganization
theory.
4
Promising Theoretical Developments
For decades following the early Chicago School studies, research testing social disorganization theory, by
and large, emphasized the critical role of two theoretical constructs: social ties and informal social control,
as discussed earlier. In more recent years, however, scholars have begun to introduce additional
theoretical concepts that borrow from – but go well beyond – social ties and informal social control. These
include collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks. For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss
these promising new theoretical directions in social disorganization theory.
Collective efficacy
As noted earlier, Sampson and Groves (1989) incited renewed interest in social disorganization theory and
its ability to explain variations in community crime rates. Recall their argument emphasized the formation
and utility of social ties in terms of providing effective social action (i.e., informal social control) to fight
crime. In recent years, scholars have begun to suggest that perhaps dense social networks of strong ties
might not be sufficient, in and of themselves, to fulfill social control functions (Browning et al., 2004;
Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Pattillo, 1998; Sampson, 2006, Sampson et al., 1997, Venkatesh, 2000, 2006).
According to some, what appears to be missing is the key factor of purposive action, that is, just how ties
are activated and resources mobilized to enhance informal social control (Sampson et al., 1997). Sampson,
Raudenbush, & Earls (1997) address this deficiency in their formulation of the concept of collective
efficacy, which they define as, “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the
common good” (921). As is evident from the definition, collective efficacy integrates cohesion and mutual
trust among residents with a culturally‐derived neighborhood dynamic (i.e., shared expectations for
control). The concept advances previous theorizing by taking into account mechanisms of social action
that may be facilitated by, but do not necessarily require, an interconnected network of strong ties
(Sampson, 2006: 152). Since “efficacy” refers to the ability to achieve a desired effect or outcome, in the
context of the theory, collective efficacy is best conceptualized as a task‐specific concept that captures
the perceived ability of a neighborhood to solve crime problems. Importantly, there are two components
of collective efficacy.
The first component is the willingness of residents to intervene for the common good of the
neighborhood. Such willingness, according to Sampson and colleagues (1997), is a necessary precursor for
establishing informal social control, or the degree to which actual behaviors are undertaken by residents
as a means to address and prevent crime. To measure this component of collective efficacy, or the
willingness to intervene, in a survey (The Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, or
PHDCN Survey), Sampson and colleagues asked 8,782 residents of 343 neighborhoods in Chicago the
likelihood that their neighbors would intervene in the following (hypothetical) scenarios: (1) if children
were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; (2) if children were spray‐painting graffiti on a
local building; (3) if children were showing disrespect to an adult; (4) if a fight broke out in the front of
their house; and (5) if the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts. Respondents
answered using a five‐item Likert‐type scale. The assumption is that those neighborhoods that score high
on the collective willingness to intervene scale are more likely to actually intervene when faced with these
and similar situations, thereby reducing the likelihood for crime in those communities.
The second component of collective efficacy is the combination of cohesion and mutual trust. The
importance of common values and similar goals among residents dates back to the earliest social
disorganization research (Park & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942). When residents are mostly self‐
5
interested and care little about the community at large, it is inherently difficult for the neighborhood to
procure resources and to activate social ties to prevent crime. However, when there is cohesion and
mutual trust among residents, there is a greater likelihood that residents will acknowledge problems in
the community, will achieve consensus on how to address them, and will solve the problems in a more
collective fashion. In this sense, cohesion and mutual trust are precursors to problem solving.
Sampson and colleagues measure this component of collective efficacy by asking respondents in their
survey the extent to which they agree with the following statements: (1) people around here are willing
to help their neighbors; (2) this is a close‐knit neighborhood; (3) people in this neighborhood can be
trusted; (4) people in this neighborhood generally don’t get along with each other; and (5) people in this
neighborhood do not share the same values.
Not surprisingly, measures of social cohesion and shared expectations for control were highly correlated
across neighborhoods in Chicago. The two components were combined to create a summary measure of
collective efficacy.
Sampson and colleagues (1997) contribute to social disorganization theory in two fundamental ways; first,
they empirically demonstrate that collective efficacy has a significant negative effect on violent crime, in
line with what social disorganization theory would predict, and second, they show that associations of
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability with violent crime are largely mediated by collective
efficacy.
The second contribution is arguably the most significant as it implies that neighborhood characteristics
are relevant to crime insofar as they produce (or fail to produce) collective efficacy. In the years since
Sampson and colleagues (1997) introduced the concept, studies examining collective efficacy in Chicago
and beyond have proliferated. In general, findings from this literature echo what Sampson and colleagues
documented – communities with greater levels of collective efficacy have lower rates of crime and
violence, controlling for other factors, and that collective efficacy mediates the effects of ecological
characteristics on crime and violence (Browning 2009; Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz, 2004; Mazerolle,
Wickes, & Mc Broom, 2010; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).
Moreover, given an emphasis on purposive action, the prevailing assumption has become that the
explanatory power of collective efficacy is not limited to just certain types of crime or violence. For
example, Browning (2002) examines the impact of collective efficacy on partner violence. Using Sampson
et al.’s survey data, as well as other data sources, he demonstrates that collective efficacy has a crime‐
reducing impact on partner violence, independent of individual and relationship characteristics that
heighten domestic violence risk.
Another study by Dekeseredy, Alvi, & Tomaszewski (2003), which examines women’s victimization in
Ontario public housing, also documents support for collective efficacy’s impact. In essence, it is becoming
clearer that collective efficacy likely impacts a range of crimes and delinquent behaviors, as well as other
related outcomes such as social disorder (see, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).
In recent years, collective efficacy scholars have turned their attention to the role of peers and the extent
to which parental supervision of teenage peer groups may matter for crime. Maimon & Browning (2010)
once again utilize PHDCN survey data to identify whether collective efficacy modifies the effect that
unstructured peer socialization has on violent behavior. Their multilevel models, involving 842 Chicago
6
residents in 78 neighborhoods, confirm that collective efficacy has a negative (independent) influence on
violence. More importantly, they find that an “individual’s unstructured socializing with peers is less likely
to result in violence within high collective efficacy neighborhoods” (466). Their results provide evidence
that collective efficacy can attenuate the deleterious effects of other social pressures on crime. Of course
in assessing collective efficacy’s usefulness for social disorganization theory, and impact in the field more
generally, one should consider the concept’s predictive validity in relation to other correlates of crime –
a task that Pratt & Cullen (2005) undertake in their meta‐analysis of macro‐level crime predictors. Pratt
and Cullen identify over 200 studies from 1960 to 1999 that have examined the ecological correlates of
crime, and perform a meta‐analysis to determine which predictors have strong and stable effects on crime
rates. Their findings reveal that relative to the other predictors, collective efficacy ranks fourth (out of 23)
in weighted effect size. Sampson (2006) argues this finding supports the notion that collective efficacy is
a robust predictor of crime rates, and is fundamental to social disorganization theory. In his presidential
address at the 2012 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Robert J. Sampson suggested
that collective efficacy, in effect, helps neighborhoods mitigate several problems – most notably, crime
and violence. Findings from the small but growing literature indicate he might be right. Yet there remain
only a limited number of studies that have empirically assessed just how collective efficacy affects crime
and related outcomes (for a more detailed discussion on this point, see Pratt & Cullen, 2005). For this
reason, researchers must continue to explore how collective efficacy impacts crime at varying points of
time and in varying social contexts. This will entail applying sophisticated and innovative methodological
approaches. Currently, we know very little about, for example, the longitudinal or reciprocal relationship
between collective efficacy and crime.
Social capital
One source in which scholars have recognized immense potential for understanding variation in
community crime rates is the impact of local organizations. Social disorganization theory presumes that
local organizations conducive to pro‐social interaction such as churches, youth groups, charities, civic
associations, and political groups, can enhance neighborhood informal social control. This is because civic
and social organizations facilitate the sharing of common values and goals among residents, thereby
increasing the collective ability to disseminate information, mobilize resources, and utilize social networks
towards combating crime (Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Triplett, Gainey, & Sun, 2003; Wilson, 1987).
Recently, criminologists have adopted the concept of social capital, defined as “the investment in social
relations with expected returns” (Lin, 1999:30), in order to argue that civically engaged communities yield
crime‐control benefits. Scholars posit that the investment in communal social relations (i.e., civic
engagement) is reflected by residents’ participation in civic and social organizations. Prosocial interaction
that originates within organizational settings extends to other settings in the greater community,
ultimately providing the expected return: the emergence or enhancement of informal social control. In
this sense, social capital refers to the potential for effective social action, as it does not directly
encapsulate purposive action. In criminology, social capital’s operationalization most frequently reflects
Lin’s (1999) higher‐order conceptualization, specifically, with respect to the investment in communal
social relations. Previous studies have measured social capital using at least one of the following types of
indicators: (1) a simple count of the number of civic and social organizations in the neighborhood; (2)
residents’ participation in these types of organizations; and (3) the level of trust among residents. The
simple count reflects investment in terms of the availability and opportunity for residents to participate
in pro‐social organizational settings. Residents’ organizational participation signifies the actual investment
7
made in these organizations. Finally, residents’ trust levels reveal the emotional investment that underlies
interpersonal relationships. Studies typically combine these indicators into a summary measure of social
capital or alternatively use one of them as a single‐measure construct (Beyerlein & Hipp, 2005; Lee, 2008;
Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer, 2001). The seminal work
of Putnam (1995, 2000) is arguably considered the standard research on social capital to date. For Putnam,
social capital is conceived as a multidimensional concept reflected by two general forms: trust and social
participation. The concept primarily features indices of political participation, civic participation, religious
participation, workplace connections, informal social ties, philanthropy, altruism, and volunteering.
According to Putnam (1995), levels of social capital in the United States have declined significantly since
the 1960s. Putnam’s evidence in support of this claim includes declining participation rates in bowling
leagues, church attendance, The Boy Scouts, labor unions, and parent– teacher associations. Putnam
maintains this decline is problematic to the extent that “successful outcomes are more likely in civically
engaged communities” (Putnam 1995: 65).
In support of this contention, state‐level analyses of archival and survey data reveal both trust and social
participation to be negatively associated with crime (Putnam, 2000). Thus, consistent with social
disorganization theory, civically active communities have a greater ability to solve and prevent crime, all
else equal. Recent research has built on Putnam by incorporating diverse measures of social capital into
analyses. Beyerlein & Hipp (2005), for example, investigate the religious component of civic engagement
on crime in US counties. Acknowledging differences in social networks among religious traditions, their
models specify the number of congregations per 100,000 for several denominations of Christianity,
including mainline Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, and Catholicism. Beyerlein and Hipp find that
greater numbers of congregations per capita – regardless of the denomination – are associated with lower
crime rates across counties.
In another study, Lee (2008) develops a civic engagement index that not only includes the number of
religious congregations, but also the number of civic associations, sport leagues, and hobby and special
interest groups in his analysis of rural US counties. Lee (2008) finds that areas with higher levels of civic
engagement have lower crime rates.
And in a third study, Peterson, Krivo, & Harris (2000) examine whether the presence of recreation centers
and libraries impact crime rates in neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio. Peterson and colleagues discover
that while libraries have little impact on crime, the presence of recreation centers appears to mitigate
violent crime in the most disadvantaged Columbus neighborhoods.
Two key challenges for researchers have been assessing the reciprocal influence that crime has on social
capital and determining social capital’s spatial effects. One study by Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer (2001)
examines the reciprocal nature of the social capital–crime relationship. Rosenfeld and colleagues perform
a series of structural equation models (SEM), which reveal that their latent variable of social capital (which
includes a dimension for both organizational participation and trust) is negatively associated with
homicide rates across a sample of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. This protective effect is
unaffected by standard correlates of crime as well as the reciprocal influence that homicide has on social
capital.
Hipp, Petersilia, & Turner (2010) address the spatial effects of social capital in their investigation of how
the availability of social capital (oriented) organizations affects the likelihood of recidivism for California
8
parolees. Examining the number of such organizations within two miles of the parolee’s current address,
Hipp and colleagues find that a one standard deviation increase in the availability of social capital oriented
organizations decreases the likelihood of recidivating by more than 40%. Although the analysis estimates
an individual‐level outcome (recidivism of individual parolees), it is not unreasonable to suggest that this
protective effect applies at the community level as well.
As previously alluded, social capital can be theorized along several dimensions as well as using a variety
of methodological approaches. Yet, there is a pressing need to identify the general effect that social capital
has on crime rates across aggregate units of analysis. Pratt & Cullen (2005) begin to address this need by
providing a (quasi) quantitative synthesis of studies associated with social capital. They focus explicitly on
the impact of noneconomic institutions, which capture those studies that examine the level of religious
and political participation within communities – two indicators frequently applied in the
operationalization of social capital. They find that the strength of noneconomic institutions ranks first (out
of 23) in weighted effect size and, in line with predictions, such institutions are negatively associated with
crime. Although their measure is only a proxy for social capital, the strength of the effect size suggests
that social capital is potentially a robust predictor of lower crime rates, and therefore crucial to
understanding the establishment of social control. The studies building upon Putnam’s seminal work are
generally supportive of an inverse relationship between social capital and crime. However, we suggest it
would be premature to conclude that social capital is a robust predictor of lower crime rates, mainly
because current studies differ so drastically with respect to units of analysis, research settings, time‐
periods, and estimated outcomes. Moreover, there is a developing concern regarding the extent to which
social capital is theoretically distinct from collective efficacy and social networks (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).
Scholars have identified mutual trust as a dimension of both social capital and collective efficacy. Similarly,
mutual trust may condition the relationship between social networks and crime. In summary, although
social capital presents the opportunity to better understand the emergence of social control in
communities, more research must be done before it is fully incorporated into social disorganization
theory.
Social ties and neighborhood networks
From the earliest formulations of social disorganization theory, the concept of social ties has occupied a
central place in the theory. An enduring assumption is that socially disorganized neighborhoods lack the
social ties that activate mechanisms of informal social control (Kornhauser, 1978; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003;
Park & Burgess, 1925; Sampson, 2006; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942). So when crime
problems emerge, the theory reasons, residents are unable to effectively respond via the dissemination
of information, the implementation of guardianship behavior, the mobilization of resources, and the
coordination of civic events. According to the theory, the formation and maintenance of informal social
control thus requires the neighborhood to have an abundant supply of strong ties that connect residents
to one another. Accordingly, criminologists have long examined how the presence of social ties as well as
their utility and content are related to neighborhood crime rates.
Despite substantial work in this area, the measurement of social ties is generally limited to two types of
indicators: (1) the quantity of social ties, and (2) the content of those ties. Such information is typically
ascertained via survey questions which instruct respondents to provide information about their social
exchanges and interactions with fellow neighbors. The first indicator reflects an assumption that there is
9
a high correspondence between an abundance of social ties and the activation of informal social control
mechanisms.
In contrast, the second indicator suggests that the type of social ties among residents (e.g., family, friends,
acquaintances, or strangers) will differentially impact the ability to prevent crime. According to the theory,
those social ties that represent emotional investment and reflect frequent interaction are deemed to be
“strong,” while those ties that exhibit less familiarity and interaction are considered to be “weak.”
Accordingly, the strength of neighborhood ties is considered fundamental to the informal control of crime.
Despite the theory’s predictions, the collective body of research suggests that the evidence in support of
social ties’ impact is mixed with respect to crime reduction. Some studies identify social ties as a catalyst
for effective social action to fight crime (e.g., Sampson & Groves, 1989) while others demonstrate that
social ties may actually facilitate crime (e.g., Pattillo, 1998). In regards to the former, the seminal article
by Sampson and Groves, discussed earlier, lends considerable support to the notion that an
interconnected network of strong ties characterizes lower‐crime neighborhoods. Recall they used data
from a large national survey of Great Britain. The survey included a question instructing respondents to
indicate how many of their friends reside in their local community, from which Sampson and Groves
constructed a community measure of local friendship networks defined as “the mean level of local
friendships” (784). Their network measure captures the abundance of social ties characterized by frequent
interaction and emotional investment. Also recall that Sampson and Groves show that the mediating
dimension of local friendship networks has an independent effect on crime and delinquency outcomes,
net of (exogenous) neighborhood characteristics. This finding suggests that neighborhood networks do
appear to activate and maintain mechanisms of informal social control. The promise of social ties for social
disorganization theory is less apparent in Bellair’s (1997) study, which explicitly assesses how the
frequency of interaction among neighborhood residents influences crime. Using survey data from
residents of 60 urban neighborhoods (spanning three states), Bellair finds that social interaction, here
defined as the percentage of community residents who get together once a year or more, reduces
community rates of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. He also finds that social interaction largely
mediates the effect of neighborhood characteristics on community crime, in support of social
disorganization theory. Yet Bellair’s findings ultimately raise questions regarding the value of social ties
for the theory. Although social interaction is significantly associated with community crime rates in the
direction the theory predicts, the fact that even infrequent interaction can reduce community crime rates
challenges the theory’s assumption that strong and dense ties are what matter most; Bellair’s “once a
year or more” definition reflects a level of interaction that is arguably less than what the perspective
theorizes.
Other studies produce conflicting evidence regarding the impact of social ties. For example, using survey
data from the city of Seattle, Warner & Rountree (1997) document mixed support for social ties’ crime
reducing impact. Their measure of social ties, or what they refer to as “local ties,” reflects the extent to
which respondents had done each of the following: (1) borrowed tools or food from neighbors; (2) had
lunch or dinner with neighbors; and (3) had helped neighbors with problems. While Warner and Rountree
find that local ties are associated with lower rates of assault in Seattle neighborhoods, they contrastingly
find that these ties are associated with higher rates of burglary. As a result, Warner and Rountree question
the assumption that social ties automatically translate into greater levels of informal social control, as the
theory predicts.
10
Even more troubling are findings from studies which suggest that social ties may, in fact, serve as a source
of social capital for offenders, thereby increasing the likelihood of offending. Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz
(2004) arrive at this conclusion in their study of the impact of collective efficacy and social ties on violent
crime rates in Chicago neighborhoods. Using Sampson’s PHDCN survey data, they discover that while
collective efficacy is associated with diminished rates of violence, social ties and exchange between
residents appears to diminish neighborhood social control. Browning and colleagues also conclude that
the “regulatory effects of collective efficacy on violence are substantially reduced in neighborhoods
characterized by high levels of network interaction and reciprocated exchange” (503).
Questionable findings regarding social ties’ impact are not limited to quantitative analyses. A study by
Pattillo (1998) qualitatively documents the complex relationships among social ties, informal social
control, and crime. Through participant observation and face‐to‐face interviews in a middle‐class black
neighborhood in Chicago, she finds that residents are highly connected to one another and that these
strong ties are characterized by emotional investment and frequent interaction. As a result, and in support
of social disorganization theory, the neighborhood is able to keep crime to a relatively acceptable level
through the supervision of youth, the identification of strangers, and the mobilization of community
organizations. However, the value of these ties comes with a trade‐off; Pattillo also finds that the social
ties frequently connect law abiding residents and criminals, thereby making it more challenging for the
neighborhood to eradicate criminal activity. This occurs because residents are reluctant to publicly shame
or legally sanction those with whom they are closely tied (even in the face of illegal behavior). Once again
these findings, which reveal that social ties can simultaneously enhance and undermine informal social
control, question the relevance of this concept for social disorganization theory. Although the evidence in
support of social ties is mixed, we do not mean to suggest that criminology should abandon studying the
impact of neighborhood networks on crime. Instead, the present challenge is to pinpoint the specific
characteristics of networks that precipitate and mitigate crime. Doing this will require scholars to
recognize, as Sampson (2006: 164) points out, that “not all networks are created equal.” In the context of
social disorganization theory, this means acknowledging that while neighborhood networks may be
capable of facilitating effective social action, they are likely not sufficient, in and of themselves, to fulfill
social control functions.
Sampson (2006) lists three reasons why neighborhood networks should not be equated with effective
social control: (1) weak ties can be equally important in the activation of informal social control (see also
Granovetter, 1973); (2) strong ties can undermine social control efforts; and, (3) social ties may connect
law‐abiding citizens with criminals and vice versa. In extending and refining the concepts of social ties and
neighborhood networks for social disorganization theory, researchers must account for these “social
facts.”
Conclusion
Social disorganization theory has long occupied an important place in criminological thought and
continues to do so well into the 21st century. But as with all theories, in order to survive it must be
continuously subjected to testing and then reevaluated in light of the empirical evidence. Despite the
theory’s predictive power, in this chapter, we have suggested there is room for improvement, particularly
when it comes to specifying the social interactional mechanisms that link structural characteristics of
communities, such as poverty and residential instability, to heightened crime rates in socially disorganized
communities. We have also suggested that such improvement may occur by attending to more recent
11
theoretical concepts that borrow from, but go beyond, social ties and informal social control. These
include collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks. In this chapter, we have defined these
concepts, explicated their usefulness for social disorganization theory, and reviewed the empirical
literature on their effectiveness. We believe these concepts hold significant promise. We conclude with
one final suggestion regarding the fundamental challenge involved in linking structural characteristics to
crime in socially disorganized communities.
This final suggestion is related to the role that neighborhood culture/ subculture likely occupies for social
disorganization theory. Although often downplayed (and even ignored) by scholars today, neighborhood
subculture was of key interest to Shaw and McKay and other early social disorganization theorists.
A central question for these scholars centered on how neighborhood subcultures became entrenched and
affected rates of delinquency. They posed the question: Under what economic and social conditions does
crime develop as a social tradition and become embodied in a system of criminal values? Shaw and McKay
found evidence regarding the impact of neighborhood subculture on crime and delinquency. Of particular
interest is their finding that areas of low economic status were characterized by diversity in norms and
standards of behavior, rather than uniformity (recall that solidarity, or an internal consensus on norms
and values, is critical for social organization). Shaw and McKay found that in poor communities, youth
were exposed to a wide variety of contradictory (and sometimes unlawful) standards rather than to a
relatively consistent and conventional pattern of norms. It was also determined that in these
communities, children were exposed to adult criminals, from whom they could learn (illegal) behavior.
In essence then, alongside social ties and informal social control, neighborhood subculture constituted a
critical component of social disorganization theory, and helped to account for why crime rates were higher
in disorganized neighborhoods. Decades following Shaw and McKay, researchers continued to examine
how neighborhood subculture impacted crime and delinquency, as well as how it was itself impacted by
neighborhood conditions (e.g., Miller, 1958; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Kornhauser, 1978).
Unfortunately, for reasons that have been explicated elsewhere (see Sampson & Bean, 2006),
neighborhood subculture increasingly became irrelevant to the theory. Discussions regarding
neighborhood subculture’s impact became obsolete and empirical examinations of the theory did not
include measures reflecting local subculture.
Most recently, however, cultural explanations have been resurrected in neighborhood research, which
we argue is a positive development. Scholars are both theorizing culture’s potential impact on community
crime rates (Anderson, 1999; Fagan & Wilkinson, 1998; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson & Bean, 2006)
as well as empirically examining just how culture and crime are associated in both organized and
disorganized communities (Berg et al., 2012; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998;
Stewart & Simons, 2006; Warner, 2003). Research on cultural effects is relatively new, so there is much
to be worked out with respect to the precise role that subculture occupies in social disorganization theory.
But scholars are beginning to sort out the issues and progress in occurring. Although we are unable to
review the important findings from this nascent but growing literature, what we can say here is that it is
becoming abundantly clear that, in the words of Kubrin & Weitzer (2003: 380), “cultural factors deserve
greater attention” and can no longer be ignored. As Shaw and McKay and other early theorists believed,
we cannot understand variations in crime rates across communities without also understanding the role
that neighborhood subcultures occupy in the calculus. Along with greater attention to the concepts of
12
collective efficacy, social capital, and social networks, future work must continue to specify subculture’s
critical role.
References
Anderson, E. (1999). Code of the Street. New York: Norton.
Bellair, P.E. (1997). Social interaction and community crime: Examining the importance of neighbor
networks. Criminology, 35, 677–703.
Berg, M.T., Stewart, E.A., Brunson, R.K., & Simons, R.L. (2012). Neighborhood cultural h eterogeneity and
adolescent violence. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28, 411–435.
Beyerlein, K., & Hipp, J.R. (2005). Social capital, too much of a good thing? American religious traditions
and community crime. Social Forces, 84, 995–1013.
Browning, C.R. (2002). The span of collective efficacy: Extending social disorganization theory to partner
violence. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 64, 833–850.
Browning, C.R. (2009). Illuminating the downside of social capital. American Behavioral Scientist, 52,
1556–1578.
Browning, C.R., Feinberg, S.L., & Dietz, R.D. (2004). The paradox of social organization: Networks,
collective efficacy, and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. Social Forces, 83, 503–534.
Bursik, R.J. (1988). Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency – problems and prospects.
Criminology, 26, 519–551.
Byrne, J. & Sampson, R.J. (1986). Key Issues in the social ecology of crime. In J. Byrne & R. Sampson (Eds.),
The Social Ecology of Crime. New York: Springer‐Verlag. Cloward, R., & Ohlin, L. (1960). Delinquency and
Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. New York: Free Press.
Dekeseredy, W.S., Alvi, S., & Tomaszewski, A.E. (2003). Perceived collective efficacy and women’s
victimization in public housing. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 3, 5–27.
Elliott, D.S., Wilson, W.J., Huizinga, D., Sampson, R.J., Elliott, A., & Rankin, B. (1996). The effects of
neighborhood disadvantage on adolescent development. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,
33, 389–426.
Fagan, J., & Wilkinson, D. (1998). Guns, youth violence, and social identity in inner cities. In M. Tonry & M.
Moore (Eds.), Crime and Justice, 24 (pp.105–188). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Granovetter, M.S.
(1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.
Hipp, J.R., Petersilia, J., & Turner, S. (2010). Parolee recidivism in California: The effect of n eighborhood
context and social service agency characteristics. Criminology, 48, 947–979.
Kirk, D.S., & Papachristos, A.V. (2011). Cultural mechanisms and the persistence of neighborhood
violence. American Journal of Sociology, 116, 1190–1233.
Kornhauser, R. (1978). Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
13
Kubrin, C.E., & Weitzer, R. (2003). New directions in social disorganization theory. Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 40, 374–402.
Kubrin, C.E., Stucky, T.D., & Krohn, M.D. (2009). Researching Theories of Crime and Deviance. New York:
Oxford University Press. Lee, M.R. (2008). Civic community in the hinterland: Toward a theory of rural
social structure and violence. Criminology, 46, 447–478.
Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social capital. Connections, 1, 28–51.
Maimon, D., & Browning, C.R. (2010). Unstructured socializing, collective efficacy, and violent behavior
among urban youth. Criminology, 48, 443–474.
Mazerolle, L., Wickes, R., & McBroom, J. (2010). Community variations in violence: The role of social ties
and collective efficacy in comparative context. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 47, 3–30.
Miller, W.B. (1958). Lower class culture as a generating milieu for gang delinquency. Journal of Social
Issues, 14, 5–19.
Park, R.E., & Burgess, E.W. (1984[1925, 1967]). The City: Suggestions for Investigation of Human Behavior
in the Urban Environment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pattillo, M.E. (1998). Managing crime in a black middle‐class neighborhood. Social Forces, 76, 747–774.
Peterson, R.D., Krivo, L.J., & Harris, M.A. (2000). Disadvantage and neighborhood violent crime: Do local
institutions matter? Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 31–63.
Pratt, T.C., & Cullen, F.T. (2005). Assessing macro‐level predictors and theories of crime: A meta‐analysis.
In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 32 (pp. 373–450). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Putnam, R.D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6, 65–78.
Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon
& Shuster.
Rosenfeld, R., Messner, S.F., & Baumer, E.P. (2001). Social capital and homicide. Social Forces, 80, 283–
309.
Sampson, R. J. (1987). Urban black violence: The effect of male joblessness and family disruption.
American Journal of Sociology, 93:348–382.
Sampson, R.J. (2006). Collective efficacy theory: Lessons learned and directions for future inquiry. In F.T.
Cullen, J.P. Wright, & K. Blevins (Eds.), Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (pp. 149–167).
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Sampson, R.J., & Bartusch, D.J. (1998). Legal cynicism and (subcultural?) tolerance of deviance: The
neighborhood context of racial differences. Law and Society Review, 32, 777–804.
Sampson, R.J., & Bean, L. (2006). Cultural mechanisms and killing fields: A revised theory of community‐
level racial inequality. Pp. 8‐36 In R.D. Peterson, L.J. Krivo, & J. Hagan (Eds.), The Many Colors of Crime:
Inequalities of Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America (pp. 8–36). New York: New York University Press.
14
Sampson, R.J., & Groves, W.B. (1989). Community structure and crime: Testing social disorganization
theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 774–802.
Sampson, R.J., & Raudenbush, S. (1999). Systematic social observation of public spaces: A new look at
disorder in urban neighborhoods. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 603–651.
Sampson, R.J., Raudenbush, S.W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study
of collective efficacy. Science, 277, 918–924.
Shaw, C.R., & McKay, H. (1969 [1942]). Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Stewart, E.A., & Simons, R.L. (2006). Structure and culture in African‐American adolescent violence: A
partial test of the code of the street thesis. Justice Quarterly, 23, 1–33.
Triplett, R.A., Gainey, R.R., & Sun, I.Y. (2003). Institutional strength, social control, and neighborhood
crime rates. Theoretical Criminology, 7, 439–467.
Venkatesh, S. (2000). American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto. Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Venkatesh, S. (2006). Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor. Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press.
Warner, B.D. (2003). The role of attenuated culture in social disorganization theory. Criminology, 41, 73–
97.
Warner, B.D., & Rountree, P.W. (1997). Local social ties in a community and crime model: Questioning the
systemic nature of informal social control. Social Problems, 44, 520–536.
Wilson, W.J. (1987). The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press
ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED AT CapitalEssayWriting.com
MAKE YOUR ORDER AND GET THE COMPLETED ORDER
CLICK HERE TO ORDER THIS PAPER AT CapitalEssayWriting.com on
Linking Structural Characteristics to Crime in
Socially Disorganized Communities